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DEBUNKING THE STRANGER-IN-THE-BUSHES MYTH:
THE CASE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT PROTECTION
ORDERS
SHAWN E. FIELDS*
"From a very young age we are taught to fear strangers. Parent[s],
teachers and loved ones warn children of stranger danger[,] instructing them
not to speak or go anywhere with someone they don't know.
"As we grow up this message is reinforced, particularly for women.
We are told to be aware of our surroundings when walking alone late at
night for fear of the stranger lurking in the bushes ready to attack. This
story of the stranger hiding in the bushes or a dark alley is also often used
when warning women about sexual assault. We are told we shouldn't go out
late at night alone, especially in parks, and that we should carry pepper
spray in our purses to be ready to fend off violent attackers. So we grow up
thinking we can pinpoint potential perpetrators-the creepy guy in the park,
the man in the hoodie walking closely behind you....
"Messages like this are not only incredibly insensitive to victims, but
dangerous for everyone. When we believe that these types of myths are
reality, victims start to question what happened to them and are reluctant to
report, people don't understand what consent really look likes, attackers
might not know they are raping women, rapists go free, rapists rape again,
rape cases aren't investigated, the list goes on and on."1
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INTRODUCTION
Sexual assault in the United States is an epidemic of staggering
proportions. One in six women and one in thirty-three men will
experience an attempted or completed rape in her or his lifetime.2 On
average, a sexual assault occurs every ninety-eight seconds; a rape
occurs every six minutes.3 In the United States, rape is the costliest
crime to its victims, totaling an estimated $127 billion per year in
medical costs, lost earnings, withdrawal from educational opportunities,
pain, suffering, and lost quality of life.4
Despite the pervasive nature of this epidemic, incredibly harmful
and dangerous myths about sexual assault continue to be peddled in
media portrayals and courtrooms. More often than not, the portrait of a
rapist in the media and popular culture resembles the mythical
"stranger-in-the-bushes," waiting to attack an unsuspecting woman on
the street.' As a result, judges continue to refer to the "classic rapist" at
2. Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/HW5D-
BPAX] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (RAINN stands for the Rape Abuse and Incest
National Network). While these statistics highlight the reality that both men and women
suffer sexual assault, this Article refers to victims by the feminine and perpetrators by
the masculine for consistency and in recognition of that fact that the vast majority of
sexual assaults follow this gendered paradigm.
3. Id.; About Sexual Assault, NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
https://www.victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/dna-resource-center/untested-sexual-
assault-kits/about-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/L97P-6MBB] (last visited Apr. 1,
2017).
4. Where We Stand: Costs, Consequences and Solutions, END SEXUAL
VIOLENCE: NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE [hereinafter Where We Stand],
www.endsexualviolence.org/where-we-stand/costs-Consequences-and-solutions
[https://perma.cc/EE5N-KG8P] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) ("Rape is the most costly of
all crimes to its victims, with total estimated costs at $127 billion a year (excluding the
cost of child sexual abuse).").
5. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 196
(1992) (criticizing the use of "non-traditional" to describe rapes that do not fit the
"stranger-in-the-bushes" type of rape, because such rapes "are all too traditional");
Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape
Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554,
555 (1993) (describing the cultural stereotype of rape as "a stranger jumping out from a
place of hiding and violently raping a physically resisting woman"); see also Katharine
K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REv. 663, 679-94 (exploring cultural and
legal barriers that make prosecutions of date rape so difficult); Dana Vetterhoffer,
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trial, and juries continue to expect to see a rape victim6 in torn clothing
running hysterically to the nearest police station or hospital.'
This "stranger-in-the-bushes" mythology does significant harm to
the sexual assault prevention movement in a number of ways. First, it
perpetuates confusion about consent by suggesting that anyone who
does not physically resist an attack from a stranger somehow "wanted
it. Second, it conditions law enforcement, judges, and juries to
distrust accusers if allegations are not supported by a wealth of
corroborating physical evidence of struggle.9 Third, it renders nearly
impossible the chance for victims to seek prospective restraining order
relief, such as no contact orders, because no such relief is needed from
a "stranger" who attacks and then disappears.
Comment: No Means No: Weakening Sexism in Rape Law by Legitimizing Post-
Penetration Rape, 49 ST. Louis L.J. 1229, 1244-45 (2005) (discussing the "paradigm
of the stranger in the bushes" type of stranger rape and contrasting it with the far more
"common acquaintance rape, [which] does not conform to this stereotype").
6. Debate rages within the sexual assault advocacy community over whether
to use the term "victim" or "survivor." See Rahila Gupta, 'Victim' vs 'Survivor':
Feminism and Language, INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY (June 16, 2014),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/victim-vs-survivor-feminism-and-
language [https://perma.ccl8JB8-6DBZ]. This Article uses the term "victim" because
the Article primarily concerns itself with those "who ha[ve] recently been affected by
sexual violence . . . [and] aspects of the criminal justice system." Key Terms and
Phrases, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases
[https://perma.cc/N4C2-D8AD] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) ("RAINN tends to use the
term 'victim' when referring to someone who has recently been affected by sexual
violence; when discussing a particular crime; or when referring to aspects of the
criminal justice system. We often use 'survivor' to refer to someone who has gone
through the recovery process . . . .").
7. In sentencing a convicted rapist to five years in prison, Judge Michael
Mettyear lamented,
It's sad to see a man of generally good character in [prison] for such a
serious [offence]. I do not regard you as a classic rapist. I do not think you
are a general danger to strangers. You are not the type who goes searching
for a woman to rape. This was a case where you just lost control of normal
restraint.
Kevin Shoesmith, Five Years Jail for Bricklayer Lee Setford Who 'Lost Control' and
Raped Drunken Woman at Beverly Home, HULL DAILY MAIL (July 2, 2014),
http://www.hulldailymail.co.uk/years-jail-bricklayer-lee-setford-8216-lost/story-
21316028-detail/story.html#7xPUh97HluCpaejq.99 [https://perma.cc/P2QQ-WD3T].
8. Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the
Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2005)
(discussing confusion within the criminal justice system over the concept of "consent"
owing to archaic notions of rape and sexual assault and implicit bias against victims of
acquaintance rape).
9. Id.; see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1379 (1997) ("There is a great
deal of anecdotal and social-scientific evidence of public (and jury) bias against norm-
violating victims of acquaintance rape.").
2017:429 The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders 433
But this myth does not reflect reality. Approximately three-
quarters of all sexual assaults are committed by close acquaintances of
the victims, meaning that victims often possess a credible fear of future
harm from ongoing contact with their assailants.'o Moreover, a majority
of all perpetrators are repeat offenders, with as many as 53% of rapists
having attempted or completed more than one rape." These realities,
often obscured by popular myth, highlight the very real and ever-
present fear of future harm felt by victims of rape and sexual assault,
and the need for prospective restraining order relief.12
Despite this risk of future harm, the legal system has largely failed
to protect victims from their perpetrators. Just as sexual assault remains
an epidemic in this country, so, too, does the widespread failure of the
criminal justice system to prosecute perpetrators. Owing to widespread
distrust of the justice system to provide protection, only 34% of all
sexual assaults are ever reported to the police.13 Less than 17% of those
reports ever lead to an arrest.' 4 District attorneys choose to prosecute
fewer than one in five of these arrests due to a lack of evidence
10. See Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/FUL8-
33TB] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) ("7 out of 10 rapes are committed by someone known
to the victim.").
11. See Eric Anthony Grollman, 9 of 10 Campus Rapes Are Committed By
Repeat Offenders [Updated], KINSEY CONFIDENTIAL (May 25, 2010),
http://kinseyconfidential.org/most-campus-rapes-are-committed-by-repeat-offenders/
[https://perma.cc/38H2-7KE4] (citing 2010 study finding that "[t]he vast majority of
the offenses are being committed by a relatively small group of men, somewhere
between 4% and 8% of the population, who do it again[,] and again[,] and again");
Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra note 10 (explaining that a majority of
perpetrators of sexual violence have criminal histories, including violent criminal sexual
histories).
12. See Hayley Jodoin, Closing the Loophole in Massachusetts Protection
Order Legislation to Provide Greater Security for Victims of Sexual Assault: Has
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258E Closed It Enough?, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
App. ADVOC. 102, 110 (2012) ("In addition to the vulnerability of a victim's actual
safety following an attack, a victim's perceptions of physical safety are often virtually
destroyed. The victim may become 'hyper-vigilant, anxious and frightened' for weeks,
months, or years after being sexually assaulted. Such fear is even more exacerbated for
the majority of victims who know their attackers, and who will be subject to on-going
contact with them after an assault. For many victims, this terror will never go away.")
(citations omitted).
13. The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/ACY2-
ZHQF] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (observing that out of every 1,000 rapes, only 344
are ever reported to police). See also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1377-78
("The main source of case attrition in acquaintance rape cases is the victim's reluctance
to pursue legal redress. . . . Scholars often attribute this phenomenon, at least in part,
to victims' fears of a hostile or overly skeptical criminal justice system . . . .").
14. The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 13 (observing that out
of 344 sexual assault reports to police, only 57 ever lead to an arrest).
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sufficient to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for criminal
offenses." Cases that do proceed often get dismissed before trial, and
of those cases proceeding to verdict, juries return convictions only 54%
of the time." Post-verdict interviews often confirm that jurors simply
do not believe victims absent clear signs of physically forcible rape
coupled with a victim taking immediate legal action against her
assailant." As a result of these evidentiary hurdles, myth-based beliefs
about rape, and victims' unwillingness to even engage in such an uphill
legal battle, it is estimated that only 0.6% of all sexual assault
perpetrators ever spend a day in jail.'"
Lacking adequate remedies for protection from the criminal justice
system, some victims turn to private civil suits for relief.19 But while
such suits are governed by a lower burden of proof and offer some
prospect of monetary compensation, they offer little by way of
protection from future harm.20 Indeed, often such suits exacerbate an
already volatile situation between victim and assailant without providing
any assurances of protection.2 1
15. Id. (observing that out of every 1,000 rapes, 57 lead to an arrest while
only 11 lead to prosecution).
16. Id. (observing that only 7 of every 11 prosecutions lead to a felony
conviction).
17. Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, A Stranger in the Bushes, or an
Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the
Context of a Mock Jury Study, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 781, 784 (2010) (noting that
many jurors subscribe to a false premise of "the averred 'real rape' prototype," and
that even when jurors later "were willing to accept that many (indeed most) rapes do
not involve 'a stranger in the bushes,' [they] nonetheless relied upon other
presumptions to relegate the trial scenario to one of 'overzealous' seduction rather than
'real rape"').
18. See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 13 ("Out of every
1000 rapes, 994 perpetrators will walk free.").
19. Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1559-
60 (2008) ("The last few years have seen a tremendous increase in lawsuits alleging
rape or sexual assault. . . . One important change in the last decade is the government's
endorsement of civil litigation as a remedy for rape victims.").
20. See generally id. at 1574-79 (discussing disadvantages of pursuing civil
suits to adjudicate rape claims).
21. See Sofia Resnick, Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault, Failed by
Criminal Justice System, Increasingly Seek Civil Remedies, REwIRE (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://rewire.news/article/2016/01/08/victims-rape-sexual-assault-failed-criminal-
justice-system-increasingly-seek-civil-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/4DN6-XPSR] (noting
that most civil suits seeking redress for sexual assault are brought against third parties
for negligence, in part because victims fear "retaliation from their assailant" if they sue
the assailant directly); Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNow YOUR IX,
http://www.knowyourix.org/issues/schools-handle-sexual-violence-reports/
[https://perma.cc/FTN6-GAZS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (Title IX student advocacy
organization observing that "[flor many survivors, campus reporting is their only
option. Many victims of sexual violence don't want to turn to the criminal justice
system . . . [because] they may fear retaliation from their assailant, who will most
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Some legislatures have attempted to address these problems by
expanding existing restraining order mechanisms to include sexual
assault. 22 These efforts, while laudable, do not go far enough to address
the unique nature of sexual assault. Civil restraining orders generally
offer prospective, victim-centered relief by: requiring the assailant to
stay away from the victim; proceeding expeditiously to address
emergent safety situations; and offering procedural flexibility, such as
lower burdens of proof and relaxed notice standards to make relief
attainable for victims. 23 By and large, however, existing restraining
order mechanisms are insufficient to protect victims of sexual assault.
For example, domestic violence restraining orders (DVROs) may
include "sexual assault" in the definition of covered violence, 24 but
DVROs almost universally are only available to victims assaulted by a
partner.25 And while many states have some form of "catchall" civil
harassment restraining order (CHRO), these restraining orders were
designed to address "merely annoying" conduct ranging from noisy
neighbors to landlord tenant disputes.26 Understandably, then, CHROs
likely not end up prosecuted, let alone convicted"); see also Kelly O'Connell, A New
Tool for Safety: Introducing Washington's Sexual Assault Protection Order, ADVOC.
NEWSL. (Wash. Coal. Of Sexual Assault Programs, Olympia, Wash.) (Aug. 2006)
http://svlawcenter.org/section-resources/resource&uscore;files/SAPONewsletter.pdf
(discussing ongoing threat of assailant, particularly after making a police report);
Protective Orders for Sexual Assault Victims, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME,
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?
DocumentlD=46683 (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (noting risk of retaliation by
perpetrator).
22. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOs) By STATE (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domesticviolencel/Chart
s/SA%20CPO%20Final%202015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMP3-DKQ2]
(summarizing the twenty-nine state statutes offering some form of civil protection relief
to victims of sexual assault).
23. Peter Johnsen & Elia Robertson, Protecting, Restoring, Improving:
Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative Justice Concepts into Civil
Domestic Violence Cases, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1557, 1558-62 (2016) (discussing
generally the history of and relaxed proceedings defining civil protection order
hearings).
24. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOs) BY STATE (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domesticviolencel/Resou
rces/statutorysummarycharts/2014%20CPO%2OAvailability%20Chart.authcheckdam.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZJ3V-N2MX] (summarizing sexual assault protection order
statutes in states throughout the country).
25. Id.
26. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 124 (noting the frequent overuse of
Massachusetts' civil harassment orders by litigants involving noise complaints and
minor physical altercations); see also David Abel, Restraining-Order Filings Unbound,
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 12, 2011),
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
employ stricter procedural guidelines to discourage frivolous filings,
often requiring a showing by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) a
course of conduct of multiple separate harassing incidents has taken
place; and (2) a real and present danger exists that the specific
harassment in question will continue.27
Such evidentiary requirements are inappropriate for sexual assault.
While as many as 29% of all sexual assaults occur within the partnered
or marital context, that leaves 71 % of sexual assault victims without the
benefit of a remedy through a DVRO.28 In addition, requiring a pattern
of repeated sexual assaults for a CHRO to issue ignores the recognition
by legislatures throughout the country that rape and sexual assault is
"the most heinous crime . . . short of murder." 29 A single incident
shatters a victim's sense of safety, such that the mere presence of the
assailant in the future has the potential to cause immeasurable
debilitating harm.30 Given these realities, it makes little sense to require
victims to demonstrate multiple sexual assaults and a credible likelihood
of yet another sexual assault in order to obtain prospective relief.
For all of these reasons, this Article makes the case for a more
carefully tailored, alternative legal remedy: the Sexual Assault
Protection Order (SAPO). A SAPO, as defined herein, is a civil
restraining order mechanism available only to victims of rape or sexual
assault, which requires a showing only by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) a sexual assault occurred or is imminently likely to
occur, and (2) the victim reasonably fears for her safety from the
assailant for any reason, not just that she fears another sexual assault.3 1
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/04/12/new kind of r
estraining order leads to surge in filings/ [https://perma.cc/4XMZ-5TDY]
(discussing the intended and unintended consequences of Massachusetts' harassment
restraining order).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2014) (California's Civil
Harassment Restraining Order requires a "course of conduct" and fear of similar future
harm to be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
28. See 21 Amazing Spousal Rape Statistics, HEALTH REs. FUNDING (Oct. 9,
2014), http://healthresearchfunding.org/21-spousal-rape-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/C4UH-YMNN] (observing that "29% of all sexual assaults of adult
women were perpetrated by a husband or lover," and "9% of all reported rapes are
perpetrated by a husband or an ex-husband").
29. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010) (Illinois' sexual
assault protection order statute: "Purpose[:] Sexual assault is the most heinous crime
against another person short of murder. Sexual assault inflicts humiliation, degradation,
and terror on victims"); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2007)
(Washington's sexual assault protection order statute: same).
30. See, e.g., BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT OF WOMEN 32-46 (Amnesty Int'l Publ'ns 2001); see also Jodoin, supra
note 12, at 110.
31. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/201; WASH. REv. CODE. ANN.
§ 7.90.020.
436
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SAPOs have gained increasing recognition by state legislatures as
appropriate and necessary, with as many as ten states amending existing
restraining order regimes in the last ten years to include some version
of SAPO relief.32
While some commentators have discussed the potential benefits of
SAPOs for particular jurisdictions, these scholars limit the discussion to
a comparison of SAPOs to DVROs and the benefits of SAPOs for one
particular state.33 Moreover, little attention has been paid to the
important and compelling constitutional counterarguments to SAPOs
and similar "quasi-criminal" restraining order statutes.34
This Article attempts, then, to contribute to existing scholarship in
three distinct ways. First, this Article addresses the critical distinctions
between sexual assault and domestic violence. Modeling SAPOs after
existing DVROs makes some logical sense. But ignoring the important
differences between sexual assault and domestic violence risks
perpetuating archaic stereotypes about rape by requiring a pattern of
past conduct or extrinsic evidence of physical struggle more often
present in the domestic violence context. Second, this Article takes a
comprehensive look at the existing nationwide legal landscape for
restraining orders in general, and SAPOs in particular. By contrasting
DVRO statutes, CHRO statutes, and newly created SAPO statutes in
one place, it hopefully will become apparent which evidentiary
procedures and types of prospective relief are most capable of
addressing the uniqueness of sexual assault. Third, this Article takes a
critical look at the persuasive arguments of skeptics that SAPOs and
other types of restraining orders amount to little more than criminal
trials by another name, creating legitimate constitutional concerns
regarding the procedural protections afforded to the accused." By
32. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22.
33. See generally, e.g., Sarah Deer, Expanding the Network of Safety: Trial
Protection Orders for Survivors of Sexual Assault, 4 TRIBAL L.J. 3 (2003-04)
(discussing the status of protection orders on Native American reservations); Jodoin,
supra note 12 (discussing Massachusetts' new sexual assault protection order
mechanism).
34. Cf. David N. Heleniak, The New Star Chamber: The New Jersey Family
Court and the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 1009, 1009-
10 (2005) (advocating for all domestic violence cases to be handled in criminal court
with criminal procedures and burdens of proof); Mary Hutton, Domestic Violence and
Due Process: Crespo v. Crespo and the Need for a Higher Standard of Proof, 37 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 103, 104 (2011) (criticizing New Jersey's lax
civil restraining order procedures and calling for a clear and convincing evidence
burden of proof in domestic violence restraining order cases).
35. See Cesare v. Cesare, 694 A.2d 603, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997), rev'd 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998) (criticizing New Jersey's Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act (PODVA): "While terroristic threats and harassment are
crimes, the thrust of [PODVA] is to somehow transmogrify those crimes into some
lesser offense not a 'crime,' but nonetheless with potential serious penal consequences,
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giving serious consideration to these concerns, this Article arrives at a
balanced approach to SAPOs and proposes a model statute that balances
the need for practical prospective relief with the need to maintain the
constitutional integrity of the process for the accused.
A brief note on structure. Part I introduces the nature of the
problem by discussing two related epidemics: sexual assault and the
failure to prosecute. Part II proposes the SAPO as a solution by
discussing the history and nature of restraining orders generally, the
need for and benefits of SAPOs in particular, and drawing comparisons
to and distinctions from existing DVROs. Part III provides a heretofore
nonexistent overview of existing SAPO and CHRO statutes. Part IV
considers constitutional concerns with SAPOs and related statutes, with
special emphasis on appropriate burdens of proof and available relief as
informed by the Supreme Court's three-part Mathews v. Eldridge36
balancing test. Part V pulls the analysis together by recommending
qualities of a model statute designed to balance competing concerns.
I. Two EPIDEMICS: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE THIS "MOST HEINOUS CRIME"
"One officer in the [Baltimore P.D.] sex crimes unit explained, 'In
homicide, there are real victims; all our rape cases are bullshit.' ('All'
was later revised by the same officer to '90 percent. ')37
As a result of efforts during the women's rights movement in the
late 1960s and 1970s to increase legal gender and sexual equality, the
American public became increasingly aware of the sexual assault
epidemic in the United States.3 Yet despite this increased awareness
and desire by state and local governments to address the issue through
existing criminal sanctions, it soon became clear that institutional
prejudice and ambivalence towards rape victims-as well as the
inherently reactive nature of the criminal justice system-prevented
when the victim signs the complaint. . . . [The effect] is to circumvent the protections
normally accorded an accused in a criminal case"); Hutton, supra note 34, at 117
(criticizing the "quasi-criminal" nature of purely civil protection order hearings).
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
37. Soraya Chemaly, How Police Still Fail Rape Victims, ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/how-police-still-fail-
rape-victims-w434669 [https://perma.cc/UM5T-7YAU] (citing Department of Justice
report on Baltimore City Police Department practices).
38. See Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 98-99 (2005); see also
Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 467 ("In the past thirty years there has been a
movement in the law seeking gender equality in sex and sexual relations. The treatment
of crimes specifically targeting women, sexual assault and domestic violence, has been
at the core of this gender equality movement.").
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victims from obtaining meaningful legal relief.39 This institutional
prejudice in the criminal justice system continues today, with one
Department of Justice report finding that, on average, police officers
with less than seven years of experience believe that 50% of rape
accusations are falsified, compared to views of more experienced
officers and researchers who find that the number is closer to 8%.4
A. The Sexual Assault Epidemic in the United States
Multiple state legislatures have formally recognized "[s]exual
assault [as] the most heinous crime against another person short of
murder." 41 Within that context, national sexual assault statistics are
truly staggering. One in six women and one in thirty-three men have
experienced an attempted or completed rape.42 On average, someone in
the United States is sexually assaulted every ninety-eight seconds;
someone is raped every six minutes.43 44% of victims are under the age
of eighteen, and 80% are under the age of thirty.44 In the United States,
rape is the most costly crime to its victims, totaling approximately $127
billion per year including medical costs, lost earnings, pain, suffering,
and lost quality of life, including lost educational opportunities.4
Importantly, and contrary to popular belief, most sexual assaults
are neither isolated incidents nor perpetrated by strangers "hiding in the
bushes."46 Approximately three-quarters of non-partner sexual assaults
are committed by someone known to the victim.47 As many as 63% of
sexual assaults are committed by repeat offenders.48 More than half of
rapists are a friend or acquaintance, and more than half of all rape and
sexual assault incidents occurred at the victim's home or within one
39. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 468 (highlighting the failure of
rape reform laws to lead to increased prosecutions).
40. See Chemaly, supra note 37.
41. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010) (Illinois' Sexual Assault
Protection Order); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2007) (Washington's
Sexual Assault Protection Order).
42. See Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra note 10; see also
Jodoin, supra note 12, at 104-05 ("Research on the prevalence of rape in the United
States suggests that between one in six and one in eight women have experienced at
least one completed rape in their lifetime.").
43. Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra note 2; About Sexual Assault,
supra note 3.
44. Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra note 2.
45. See Where We Stand, supra note 4.
46. See Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 5, at 570.
47. See Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, supra note 10.
48. See Grollman, supra note 11.
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mile of the home.4 9 These facts-that most sexual assaults are
committed by someone in the victim's life in or near the victim's
home-highlight the very real and credible fear of future harm
expressed by many victims of sexual assault.
B. The Failure of the Criminal Justice System to Address the Epidemic
"In the wake of demands for equal rights for women under the law
and tighter criminal justice controls during the 1970s, reform of rape
laws became a legislative priority."" Over the next three decades, state
legislatures began responding to this political pressure by reforming and
redrafting rape statutes." These criminal justice reforms focused
almost exclusively on the victim's role within the criminal
justice system . . . [and] fell into four categories: (1)
redefinition of the offense (repealing spousal exemptions and
abolishing specific gender roles for the accuser and accused);
(2) evidentiary reforms (elimination of corroboration
requirements, enactment of rape shield statutes); (3) reforms
in statutory age requirements; and (4) reforms in statutory
structures (grading of offenses according to severity of force
and resulting injuries).52
These statutory reforms have failed to result in more effective
prosecutions . Two primary reasons exist for the failure of these well-
meaning, yet ineffective reforms. First, the unique nature of sexual
assaults presents difficult evidentiary issues for prosecutors, who must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sexual assault often occurs
behind closed doors and involves private, intimate circumstances only
truly known to two people-the victim and the assailant. As a result,
district attorneys decline to prosecute the vast majority of sexual assault
49. Sexual Assault and Rape Statistics, Laws, and Reports, SEXUAL ASSAULT
RESPONSE SERVS. S. ME., http://www.sarsonline.org/resources-stats/reports-laws-
statics [https://perma.cc/9Y7W-T5CR] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) ("More than half of
all rape/sexual assault incidents were reported by victims to have occurred within one
mile of their home or at their home.").
50. Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 469.
51. Id. at 469-70.
52. Id. at 470.
53. Id. at 467-68 ("Few commentators can point to any data suggesting that
criminal rape reform laws have deterred the commission of rape, increased its
prosecution, or increased conviction rates. In short, the 'outcomes' of the criminal
justice system-arrest, indictment, and conviction-have remained fairly constant.")
(citations omitted); see also David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv.
317, 320 (2000).
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cases due to the lack of extrinsic evidence, leaving victims with no
criminal remedies."
Second and more troublingly, the failure of these reforms appears
rooted in the perpetuation of archaic societal attitudes about "sexual
autonomy and gender roles in sexual relations."s" As one commentator
poignantly noted:
The vast majority of people-including law enforcement
personnel, judges and potential jurors-remain conflicted
about what constitutes 'consensual' sex. They are ambivalent
about placing criminal sanctions on 'non-violent' sexual
assault or, for that matter, anything short of violent
penetration that results in physical injuries. Jurors,
prosecutors and police are confused about the boundary line
between sex and rape."
Recent highly publicized rape cases seem to confirm this
"confusion," at least on the part of judges. In one notorious case, Judge
Robin Camp asked a nineteen-year-old victim who was raped over a
bathroom sink, "Why couldn't you just keep your knees together? . . .
Why didn't you just sink your bottom down into the basin so he
couldn't penetrate you? . . . If you were frightened, you could have
screamed."" Judge Camp also wondered aloud during the trial "why
she allowed the sex to happen if she didn't want it," and that "[s]he
certainly had the ability, perhaps learnt from her experience on the
streets, to tell (him) to f--- off. ""
Recent Department of Justice reports about police responses to
rape allegations confirm that "confused" may be too generous a
description of attitudes towards rape and sexual assault. Rolling Stone
magazine offered a compelling summary of one such report about the
Baltimore Police Department:
54. See Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1046 (Wyo. 1986) ("According to FBI
statistics comparing rape prosecutions with prosecutions of other violent crimes, rape is
one of the most difficult to prosecute successfully."); see also Bryden & Lengnick,
supra note 9, at 1196 ("Afraid that losing cases will look bad on their records,
prosecutors are excessively reluctant to prosecute acquaintance rapists.").
55. Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 468 ("While laws about rape have
changed, attitudes about sexual autonomy and gender roles in sexual relations have
not.").
56. Id.
57. Melissa Chan, Canadian Judge Under Review for Berating Teen Rape
Victim, N.Y. DAILY NEws (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/canadian-judge-review-berating-teen-rape-
victim-article-1.2431358 [https://perma.cc/5Y6J-7VKM].
58. Id.
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Last week, the Department of Justice released a scathing
report of the Baltimore City Police Department, concluding
that officers were pervasively abusing their power in bluntly
racist and gender-biased ways. . . .
In addition to illuminating these racist outcomes, the report
also shed light on police failures related to the treatment of
sexual assault victims, overwhelmingly women and
overwhelmingly black. Investigators found that the
department treats victims of sexual assault with 'undue
skepticism,' and then went on to cite examples of officers
dismissing assault, mocking or insulting survivors and
harassing victims.
One officer asked a woman bringing a rape charge, 'Why are
you messing that guy's life up?' In another case, an officer is
described laughing when a prosecutor calls a victim a
'conniving little whore.' . . . This report exists alongside the
facts that between 2010 and 2014 only 15 percent of rape kits
gathered by the city were processed and only 17 percent of
sexual assault reports resulted in arrests.
While many people are outraged and horrified by the findings
of the new DOJ report, what it found is not rare. Studies-and
a regular stream of disturbing examples-consistently expose
systemic problems in police treatment of sexual assault
victims: harassing treatment of victims, the downgrading and
miscoding of rape, failures to investigate cases, repeated
officer sexual misconduct and abuses of power. A second
remedy, thorough and consistent training in the complexity of
sexual and intimate partner violence, also remains elusive,
despite a torrent of incidents over years in which the police
exhibit beliefs in gender stereotypes and rape myths. The two
remedies are related, in the most basic sense that men tend to
have more inaccurate beliefs about rape than women do.
It makes sense that untrained and ill-informed police officers
are no less subject to popular rape myths than anyone else.
However, studies have shown that police-in line with studies
of other fraternal settings, like college fraternities-are less
likely to believe sexual assault victims. In 2012, police in
Cranberry, Pennsylvania were found liable in the harassment
of a victim, saying to her, among other things, 'Your tears
won't save you now.' Rape victims are sometimes
'interviewed' in interrogation rooms. For years, people
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reporting sexual assault in St. Louis were urged by police to
sign a 'Sexual Assault Victim Waiver,' which absolved the
police from responsibility for investigating the crime or
reporting it to the FBI.
When victims don't conform to idealized versions of what a
rape victim should look and act like, untrained and
inexperienced officers, like most people, are highly likely to
doubt them. Studies show that surveyed police officers think
up to 50 percent of rape victims are making false claims, until
they have more than seven years of experience working with
them, after which the estimate drops to between eight and 10
percent, closer to the two to eight percent of cases that
researchers have found is accurate. Related problems of bias
and rape mythologizing exist at every level of the criminal
justice system, beginning with dispatchers who are often
responsible for assigning a criminal code to incidents as they
are reported, and ending in courtrooms, where judges
have enormous leeway in sentencing, often with deplorable
outcomes for victims.
Sixty-nine percent of police departments surveyed in 2012
reported that dispatchers, frequently with little or no training,
are initially responsible for coding crimes. These codes are
important because they are analyzed in order to understand
trends and to allocate resources. Rapes are among the more
frequently downgraded and miscoded crimes reported, which
hides the high incidence of rape in the United States. In 2014,
for example, an Ohio 911 dispatcher was recorded harshly
insisting over the phone that a 20-year-old woman reporting
her rape 'quit crying' and went on to tell her that the police
would never find her assailant based on her description. From
dispatchers, victims are passed along what is often a hostile
chain of interviews, interrogations, rape kit collection, a
failure of departments to investigate-and, sometimes,
outright police cover-ups. Dr. Debra Patterson, an associate
professor at the Wayne State University School of Social
Work, studied police interactions with sexual assault survivors
and found that up to half experience secondary victimization
as a result of reporting the crime."
As a result of this societal ambivalence and confusion about
"sexual autonomy and gender roles in sexual relations," combined with
59. Chemaly, supra note 37.
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the sometimes shocking treatment of victims by law enforcement
personnel, sexual assault victims, and "especially acquaintance rape
victims, continue to encounter the same hurdles that they did thirty
years ago." 60 Given the threat of such publicly humiliating and
degrading treatment, it is little wonder that sexual assault remains the
"least reported, least indicted and least convicted felony in the United
States." 6' According to a report by the Department of Justice, over
65 % of rapes and sexual assaults are never reported to the police.62 Of
the sexual assaults that are reported, approximately 18% ever lead to an
arrest. 63 Even when there is an arrest, as many as 48% of these cases
are dismissed before trial.64 For the small fraction of sexual assault
cases that do proceed to trial, the felony conviction rate stands at
approximately 54%.'6 Of those convicted, nearly 25% of perpetrators
are released on probation without ever setting foot inside of a prison.66
In total, of all the rapes and sexual assaults committed in the United
States, only 0.6% resulted in the incarceration of the offender.67
C. The Effects of the Failure to Prosecute on Victims and Society
Sexual assault, by its very nature, represents the most intimate and
soul-shattering violation of a person's body. This very personal
violation shatters a victim's sense of dignity and self-worth, in part
because the assailant dehumanizes and degrades the victim, seeing her
not as a human being but merely a physical vessel for his pleasure.68
60. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 468-69 ("These hurdles
include[:] the centralizing of the victim's dress, behavior and state of mind[;] the
brutalizing attack on her privacy by the threat of public use of rape crisis, medical, and
therapy records[;j the continuing ability of the defense to litigate the character, conduct
and mental health of the victim in an effort to prove consent or motive to lie[; and the
continuing view that victims should demonstrate a set of behaviors consistent with
someone who has really suffered the trauma of assault. Jurors still expect evidence of
fresh complaints by victims with accompanying hysteria and torn clothes, as well as
other indicia of resistance even when resistance is not a statutory element.").
61. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 105.
62. LYNN LANGTON ET AL., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED
TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010, at 1 (2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp06lO.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFD7-4JG8].
63. Eliza Gray, Why Victims of Rape in College Don't Report to the Police,
TIME (June 23, 2014), http://time.com/2905637/campus-rape-assault-prosecution/
[https://perma.ce/8SSY-KYQX].
64. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 107.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. LANGTON ET AL., supra note 62.
68. CAMERON BOYD, AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR STUDY SEXUAL ASSAULT, THE
IMPACTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT ON WOMEN (2011),
https://aifs.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/rs2.pdf
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This destruction of personhood often leads to a constant "hyper-
vigilant, anxious and frightened" state for weeks or years after being
assaulted.
The inherently disempowering effect of sexual assault also leaves
victims feeling permanently unsafe and vulnerable to future attacks.
Many victims describe a feeling of powerlessness and lack of control in
every aspect of their lives, including in their ability to maintain any
sense of safety in the world.70
Within this context, it is tragic that current stereotyped attitudes
towards sexual assault in the criminal justice system subject victims to
unnecessary secondary trauma and disempowering claims of false
accusations. These realities have directly contributed to widespread
feelings of fear and distrust by sexual assault victims towards the
criminal justice system, a withdrawal from legitimate forms of
protection, and an unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement in
other areas beyond just the initial assault." This distrust reinforces the
lack of safety and security felt by victims in every aspect of their lives.
The effects of this broken system are felt by society at large as
well. In addition to the crippling economic cost discussed previously,
failures to prosecute this "most heinous crime" contributes to feelings
of impunity for sexual predators, increasing recidivism rates.72 While
only approximately 6% of men ever attempt or complete a rape, a
staggering 63% of these men are repeat offenders.7 3 At a 2014 Summit
[https://perma.cc/RHM6-PZ5S] (quoting an unnamed survivor articulating a common
post-traumatic stress response: "Sense of a foreshortened future was for me the most
terrifying symptom of trauma, I was obsessed with the thought that I was going to die .
. . even though he was gone, my psyche still behaved as if it expected a disaster to
happen"); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., BEYOND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
TRANSFORMING OUR NATION's RESPONSE TO RAPE, 1-1, 23, 3-1 (Susan H. Vickers et
al. eds., 2003) (discussing shattering effect sexual assault has on victim's sense of
safety).
69. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 110 ("Such fear is even more exacerbated for
the majority of victims who know their attackers, and who will be subject to on-going
contact with them after an assault. For many victims, this terror will never go away.").
70. The Trauma of Victimization, NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-
victims/trauma-of-victimization [https://perma.cc/76QX-KP2G] (last visited Apr. 1,
2017) (describing the responses of victims in the immediate aftermath of assaults).
71. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 472 ("[Mlany victims simply do
not view the criminal justice system as one that will provide them with protection.");
see also Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia
by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539,
622 (1992) (noting how many victims choose not to report sexual assault because those
who do find themselves forced to "reveal intimate, painful details [of their assault] to
different prosecutors and different judges").
72. See supra Part I.
73. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, What if Most Campus Rapes Aren't
Committed By Serial Rapists, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 13, 2015, 11:00 AM),
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on Sexual Assault at Dartmouth College, one Department of Justice
official made a startling announcement: "We know that the majority of
rapes are committed by serial rapists, and those folks are very unlikely
to be reached by any prevention messages that we're going to be
sending out, or education about rape."7 4 The official concluded that at
least part of the failure of education and outreach programs could be
attributed to inadequate enforcement mechanisms, giving serial rapists
little disincentive to stop committing sexual assault."
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE SEXUAL ASSAULT PROTECTION
ORDER
Despite attempts to address the sexual assault epidemic through
modification of existing criminal codes, lingering prejudice and
ambivalence-combined with the rigidity of the criminal system-has
rendered traditional legal avenues all but useless for sexual assault
victims. The shockingly low incarceration rate for perpetrators of rape
and sexual assault clearly indicates a failure of the criminal justice
system to adequately protect victims of sexual assault, particularly "in
light of startling evidence that sexual assault victims face significant
safety risks following an attack."76 As one commentator cogently
observed:
In some cases, the assailant poses a risk of assaulting the
victim again. In other cases, the assailant may utilize the fear
created by the first attack to continue to threaten, intimidate,
or prevent the victim from seeking assistance or reporting the
incident to law enforcement. The victim may also be
vulnerable to retaliation by the assailant if she chooses to seek
assistance or report the crime to law enforcement. Other
victims often experience stalking in conjunction with their
assault. Moreover, all of these risks are heightened if the
victim is subject to on-going contact with the assailant. The
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-most-campus-rapes-arent-committed-by-
serial-rapists/ [https://perma.cc/S4GW-X68W].
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Fred Thys, At Summit on Sexual Assault, Administrators
Learn Strategies to Stop Serial Rapists, WBUR NEWS (July 16, 2014),
http://www.wbur.org/news/2014/07/16/at-summit-on-sexual-assault-administrators-
learn-strategies-to-stop-serial-rapists [https://perma.cclJJ2Q-Y2HM].
76. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 108 (citing study by The National Center for
Victims of Crime highlighting the risk of retaliation by perpetrators of sexual assault).
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victim may be at particular risk if the assailant knows where
the victim lives, works, or goes to school."
Recognizing these unique challenges faced by sexual assault
victims, advocates have lobbied for decades for alternative legal
remedies freed from the constraints of the criminal system and designed
to provide prospective victim-centered relief.78 These advocacy efforts
closely mirror the efforts to reform domestic violence prosecution laws,
efforts which led to the creation of "quasi-criminal" domestic violence
restraining order remedies in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. 79 The similarities between domestic violence and sexual
assault-both involve physical assaults, often in private intimate settings
with no witnesses besides the parties and little conclusive evidence,
making criminal prosecution problematic at best-provide a logical
justification for the creation of similar civil protection remedies for both
offenses.
The following section provides an overview of civil protection
orders generally, the need for and benefits of a carefully tailored
protection order for sexual assault, and an informative comparison of
SAPOs to DVROs.
A. Civil Protection Orders Generally
A civil protection order, also known as a restraining order,
provides a prospective civil remedy for victims by placing a "legal
burden on the assailant to have no further contact with the victim."o
Civil protection orders provide victims of criminal violence with an
alternative to the criminal justice system, where the slow nature of the
proceedings, higher burden of proof, lack of available victim-centered
remedies, and requirement that victims confront their assailants often
77. Id. at 108-09; see also JESSICA E. MINDLIN & LIANI JEAN HEH REEVES,
CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: MEETING
THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 40 (2005) (citations omitted),
https://law.Iclark.edu/live/files/6469-rights-and-remedies-meeting-the-civil-legal-needs
[https://perma.cc/TL4W-DBLJ] (discussing the right of stalking post-sexual assault);
O'Connell, supra note 22 (discussing safety risks of ongoing contact with the assailant
after a sexual assault); Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, supra note 21.
78. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 467-69 (summarizing the
history of rape law reform).
79. See Smith, supra note 38, at 96-98 (summarizing history of domestic
violence law reform).
80. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 115 ("Such orders derive from the traditional
common law civil injunction, and were adapted initially in the 1970s as a mechanism to
protect victims of domestic violence.").
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makes it an impractical and unappealing option for victims of intimate
crime.8
"The process for obtaining a civil protection order varies by
jurisdiction," but is nearly always more expedient, simple, and
prospective than the process governing criminal trials. In most states,
petitioners can obtain a temporary or emergency protection order, valid
for up to three weeks, without a full hearing.8 ' These emergency
provisional measures are often granted ex parte, but constitutional due
process requires courts to hold an evidentiary hearing shortly after the
issuance of the temporary order, and the restrained party must be given
notice of the hearing .84 After a hearing, the court can make the order
"permanent," but most state statutes limit the permanence of these
orders to a period of one to three years.8 1 "Civil rules of procedure
apply, including a standard of proof that is lower than [the 'beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt' standard] in criminal cases"-the highest standard of
proof in the American legal system.86
In addition to more favorable procedures, civil protection orders
offer victim-centered options for relief that are often more
comprehensive than those available in criminal protection orders (and
certainly in criminal sentencing). Civil protection orders can require the
assailant to stay away from the victim, and in some states, civil
protection orders can include orders relating to child custody,
visitation, and support.87 They can grant the victim restitution or other
economic relief, including possession of a shared residence or other
property." Some state civil protection orders can also require assailants
to relinquish firearms, seek counseling, or undergo drug and alcohol
81. Smith, supra note 38, at 97 (describing nature and history of civil
protection orders).
82. Id. at 100.
83. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2014) (civil
harassment restraining order authorizing Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) without
notice for fifteen to twenty-two days).
84. Smith, supra note 38, at 100-01; see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-14-103 (West 2013) (Colorado civil restraining order requiring permanent hearing
within three weeks of granting of TRO); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (same); 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 22/208 (West 2010) (Illinois Sexual Assault Protection Order
requiring same).
85. Smith, supra note 38, at 101.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-103 (authorizing temporary
child placement as appropriate remedy); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (West 2014)
(Oregon civil harassment statute authorizing relief necessary to "[p]rovide for the safety
and welfare of the petitioner and the children in the custody of the petitioner"); see
generally ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 24.
88. See generally ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra
note 24.
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89treatment. Unlike remedies in criminal proceedings, which punish the
offender for past acts while ignoring the ongoing needs of the victim,
these civil protection order remedies are non-punitive measures
designed to prospectively prevent future harm.
B. The Need for a Civil Protection Order Specifically for Sexual Assault
As demonstrated supra, existing criminal justice remedies fall far
short of offering the type of prospective protection sexual assault
victims need to regain a sense of security from their assaults. Private
civil suits and existing civil protection order mechanisms likewise fail
to provide the kind of carefully tailored relief required to address sexual
assault. And even if criminal justice reforms increased the efficacy of
prosecutions against assailants, the inherently offender-centric nature of
criminal prosecutions fails to account for the specific needs of sexual
assault victims.
1. PRIVATE CIVIL SUITS Do NOT OFFER ADEQUATE PROSPECTIVE
SECURITY
Among the legal options available to sexual assault victims, private
civil lawsuits seeking monetary or other redress for criminal activity
may provide the fewest protections actually needed by victims. An
obvious advantage of the private civil mechanism is that such suits are
governed by the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as
opposed to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal trials,
making it an attractive alternative for sexual assault cases often lacking
in overwhelming extrinsic evidence. 90 Private suits also give the victim
control over the proceedings in a way that state-sponsored criminal
proceedings cannot. However, private civil lawsuits generally are
concerned with redressing past conduct through the award of money
89. See generally id.
90. See Lininger, supra note 19, at 1579-80 (discussing benefits of civil suits
for sexual assault). Perhaps the most famous example of a civil suit succeeding to seek
redress for criminal activity after the failure to secure a criminal conviction is the O.J.
Simpson case. After famously being acquitted for the murders of Ron Goldman and
Nicole Brown Simpson, Simpson was nevertheless found civilly liable for their deaths
in a subsequent lawsuit and ordered to pay millions of dollars in restitution to the
victims' families. B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Jury Decides Simpson Must Pay $25
Million in Punitive Award, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/1 1/us/jury-decides-simpson-must-pay-25-million-in-
punitive-award.html [https://perma.cclYA4K-Z4C3].
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damages rather than providing prospective protection and other relief to
victims in emergent situations.9
Of course, preliminary injunctive relief is available to private civil
litigants that can afford temporary prospective relief by protecting the
status quo, but the wheels of traditional civil justice spin too slowly for
the sexual assault victim in need of immediate, permanent solutions.
Lacking a reliably timely mechanism by which victims can secure
permanent injunctive relief, the traditional civil system lacks the
flexible and expedient structures required for an effective prospective
remedy.
2. EXISTING CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS IMPOSE UNNECESSARY
BARRIERS TO PROTECTION
Compared to civil actions for damages, civil protection order
actions provide prospective, immediate, victim-centered relief needed
by sexual assault victims. However, most existing civil protection order
statutes either are simply not available to sexual assault victims or
impose evidentiary requirements more suitable for noise complaints or
bar fights than for allegations of rape or sexual assault.
a. Civil Protection Orders Tailored to Non-Sexual Assaults
Many states, in recognition of the unique nature of certain types of
harassment, have enacted a series of civil restraining order remedies
tailored to specific circumstances. These types of restraining orders
include, inter alia, elder abuse restraining orders, workplace violence
restraining orders, and stalking restraining orders.92 Though sexual
assault may be present in each of these situations and may serve as a
satisfactory type of "harassment" sufficient for the restraining order to
issue, these narrowly tailored orders obviously do not and cannot
address the vast majority of sexual assault cases.
The restraining order most commonly-if inaccurately-associated
with sexual assault cases is the DVRO. Some version of the DVRO
exists in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and virtually all of
them explicitly state that a single instance of sexual assault suffices for
91. Lininger, supra note 19, at 1579-80 (noting that injunctions are available
in traditional civil proceedings but are generally much longer and more arduous
evidentiary processes).
92. See Restraining Orders, CAL. CTs.: THE JUD. BRANCH CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1260.htm [https://perma.cc/43FV-EA63] (last visited Apr. 3,
2017) (listing all types of restraining orders in California, including "Domestic
Violence Restraining Order," "Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Order,"
"Civil Harassment Restraining Order," and "Workplace Violence Restraining Order").
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a restraining order to issue.9 However, virtually all of these statutes
require the presence of a partnered relationship between victim and
assailant for the order to apply.94 While the majority of sexual assaults
occur between acquaintances, an acquaintance relationship is
insufficient for purposes of a DVRO. As seen below with the case of
Noora, this subtle distinction in the status of the relationship between
victim and assailant can make all the difference in a state like California
with no carefully tailored SAPO statute:
Noora,95 an Iraqi refugee resettled east of San Diego, found
herself homeless after her husband was sent to prison and she
could no longer afford rent. Desperate, Noora took a friend's
suggestion that she offer house cleaning and cooking services
in exchange for a room. The friend recommended Noora to
Daniel, a joint acquaintance, who offered to provide her with
a spare room in his house in exchange for regular house
cleaning and maintenance.
Within two weeks of moving in, Noora was forcibly sexually
assaulted by Daniel. Daniel threatened her with a gun and
explained that she would be back on the streets within a day if
she did not consent to his demands. Over the next month
Daniel raped Noora approximately twenty times before Noora
finally called the police and had Daniel arrested. The District
Attorney declined to prosecute the case, citing a lack of
evidence.
Noora then turned to the civil court system for protection and
sought a restraining order against Daniel. At the hearing,
Daniel defended himself by claiming he and Noora were
engaged to be married and had only had consensual sex as a
part of their intimate relationship. Noora vehemently denied
the existence of any relationship, and offered extrinsic
93. Smith, supra note 38, at 100; see ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, supra note 24.
94. Smith, supra note 38, at 96; see ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, supra note 24.
95. While this story is based on actual events, all names have been changed
to protect the privacy of the parties. The civil action described herein was brought on
behalf of the victim by the Center for Community Solutions, a non-profit legal and
advocacy organization and the only rape crisis center in San Diego County. I became
familiar with Noora's case during research for this Article in interviews with CCS staff
attorneys, including NoEl Harlow, who represented Noora in her CHRO hearing. See
Interview with NoEl Harlow, Attorney, Center for Community Solutions (Apr. 28-29,
2013) [hereinafter Harlow Interview] (notes on file with Author).
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evidence, including police testimony, that Daniel had
threatened her with multiple guns, including an unregistered
firearm. The court found the evidence "compelling," but
found that it did not meet the statutory "clear and convincing
evidence" burden of proof required by the statute because it
was "not immediately and patently obvious on its face that the
alleged conduct occurred."96
Ironically, had Noora not challenged Daniel's false claim that
he and Noora were in an intimate relationship Noora likely
would have prevailed. In California, domestic violence
restraining order hearings based on allegations of partner
violence require only proof by a preponderance of the
evidence-in other words, that it was "more likely than not"
that the alleged conduct took place. But because Noora was
not partnered with her assailant, she did not qualify for a
domestic violence restraining order and its relaxed burden of
proof. Her only recourse as a victim of sexual assault was to
seek relief under California's more generic "civil harassment
restraining order," which governs everything from neighbor
disputes to prank phone calls and requires a showing by
"clear and convincing evidence."
b. "Catchall" CHROs
Noora's case illustrates an example of what this Article calls
"catchall" CHROs, or civil harassment restraining orders. These
CHROs, which exist in approximately twenty-one states, are designed
to govern all forms of harassment disputes not covered by DVROs or
any other specially protected situation like elder abuse." These statutes
are employed by petitioners for a wide range of conduct, from landlord
tenant disputes to neighbor disputes over noise to cyberbullying.98
Given the limitless application of these statutes and the obvious risk of
frivolous litigation arising from the abusive application of these
statutes, virtually all CHROs impose heightened filing and evidentiary
requirements. Typically, these requirements include: (1) a demonstrated
96. These quotes come from the presiding judge in Noora's permanent Civil
Harassment Restraining Order hearing, who made these comments at oral argument.
See Harlow Interview, supra note 95. The oral argument itself was neither recorded nor
transcribed due to budget cuts to California's judiciary. See Kramm Court Reporting,
San Diego Court Reporters in Civil Courtrooms are Laid Off - November 5, JD SuPRA
Bus. ADvIsOR (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/san-diego-court-
reporters-in-civil-court-83782/ [https://perma.cclX83F-FHPK].
97. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22.
98. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 127.
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pattern of three or more separate incidents of harassment; 99 (2) a
demonstrated credible fear that the same type of conduct will continue
in the future;'" and (3) proof of both elements by clear and convincing
evidence.o'
Applying CHROs to sexual assault creates a host of problems.
First, the mere grouping of sexual assault with "harassment" or merely
"annoying conduct" inherently diminishes the seriousness of sexual
assault as "the most heinous crime short of murder." Second, "such a
misclassification . . . diminishes the public['s] awareness of the
statute's [applicability to sexual assault] and misleads eligible
individuals into believing that [such a] statute does not offer them
protection."1 02 Third, requiring sexual assault victims to use the same
mechanism as noisy neighbors exposes them to "misdirected
opposition."103 Many critics of CHROs point to their overuse as
retaliatory devices by litigants in trivial matters.104 Sexual assault is
anything but trivial.o
Practical considerations limit the utility of CHROs as well. The
very private and intimate nature of sexual assault creates evidentiary
problems, particularly given the fact that most rapes do not occur
during or after a violent physical altercation with the assailant. As in
Noora's case, this paucity of evidence makes meeting a heightened
clear-and-convincing evidence standard all but impossible in most
99. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, §1 (2010) (Massachusetts civil
harassment order available to a person who suffers from three or more acts of
harassment).
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2014) (civil harassment restraining
order requiring proof of credible fear of future harm of the same kind of conduct
leading to the original petition).
101. Id. (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence).
102. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 129.
103. Id.
104. See id.; see also Abel, supra note 26 (discussing "surge" in restraining
order filings under Massachusetts' catchall CHRO and court officials' dissatisfaction
with number of complaints); Editorial, Harassment Orders May Cause More Problems
Than They Solve, MASS. LAW. WKLY. (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://masslawyersweekly.com/2010/12/09/harassment-orders-may-cause-more-
problems-than-they-solve! [https://perma.cc/8V7H-H8V5] (discussing abuse of statute
by frivolous litigants).
105. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 127 ("The problem with including sexual
assault in a statute that is largely intended as a harassment statute is that sexual assault
is not synonymous with harassment, and it implicates considerations different than those
encountered by harassment victims. . . . [T]he concerns underlying the adoption of the
heightened standard [of proof in civil harassment hearings]-neighbor arguments, 'bar
fights,' 'landlord tenant disputes,' 'minor violent crimes,' and other 'frivolous
reasons,'-are not considerations that are applicable to sexual assault victims. Rather,
claims for protection by sexual assault victims, like those of domestic violence victims,
are inherently non-frivolous due to the serious violent nature of the crime.") (citations
omitted).
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situations '1 Moreover, requiring a victim to prove multiple sexual
assaults discounts the seriousness of sexual assault as an attack on one's
entire person. While preventing someone from running to court the first
time a neighbor's turns a stereo up too loudly makes some sense,
preventing a rape victim from seeking protection after a single assault
does not.
Likewise, a sexual assault victim should not have to prove that she
will likely suffer another sexual assault from the perpetrator for a
restraining order to issue. As discussed supra, sexual assault victims
feel a real and ever-present sense of insecurity after being violated at
such an intimate physical level, and the mere presence of the assailant
risks triggering and re-traumatizing her."o7 Where it seems logical to
require a neighborhood noise complainant to demonstrate a likelihood
that the same noisy conduct is likely to continue absent court
intervention, the serious traumatic effects of sexual assault are such that
victims should not be forced to prove they will likely be raped or
sexually assaulted before receiving protection from the perpetrator's
presence.o10
106. See Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) ("[A] clear-and-convincing standard would saddle victims of [intimate] violence
with a burden that would often foreclose relief in many deserving cases. When the
testimony of the plaintiff is pitted against the testimony of the defendant, with no other
corroborating testimony or evidence, a plaintiff would likely have difficulty sustaining
the sterner standard urged by defendant here."); JOHN F. DECKER & CHRISTOPHER
KOPACZ, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES, 8-10/11
(LexisNexis 5th ed. 2012) ("Prosecutors seeking to achieve a rape conviction [are]
faced with evidentiary barriers as well. The Illinois Supreme Court explained that,
because as 'Lord Hale once aptly observed[,] . . . an accusation of rape is easily made,
hard to be proved and still harder to be defended by one ever so innocent,' it was
necessary that . . . a rape complainant's testimony either had to be clear and convincing
or be corroborated by other evidence."); Matthew Q. Clarida & Madeline R. Conway,
Univ. Announces New Sexual Assault Policy Including Central Office, 'Preponderance
of the Evidence' Standard, HARV. CRIMSON (July 2, 2014),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/7/3/new-sexual-assault-policies/
[https://perma.cc/Z6A6-9EPN] (discussing change in Title IX sexual assault complaint
policies at Harvard after outcry over clear-and-convincing evidence standard).
107. See Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Survivors, AM. ACAD.
EXPERTS IN TRAUMATIC STRESS, http://www.aaets.org/article178.htm
[https://perma.cc/325W-MX24] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (describing rape trauma
syndrome, including the ability to be triggered into a state of paralysis in the presence
of one's attacker).
108. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 128 (criticizing confusion in Massachusetts'
harassment statute regarding whether "the sexual assault plaintiff [must] prove that she
is in a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of the same type of 'harassment'
alleged when she initially filed the order. . . . However, many sexual assault victims
may not be in a substantial likelihood of being sexually assaulted again. They may,
however, be vulnerable to harassment, intimidation, or other physical or psychological
harm at the hands of their attacker") (citations omitted).
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3. EVEN EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS LACK VICTIM-CENTERED
SOLUTIONS
A primary problem with the current legal landscape for sexual
assault victims is the woeful inadequacies of the criminal justice system
to treat victims fairly and effectively incapacitate offenders. Yet, even
if reform efforts led to more humane treatment of victims and increased
incarceration rates for perpetrators, the very nature of criminal
prosecutions in this country deprive victims of the power and control so
many sexual assault victims need following the assault.109
The "victim" in criminal prosecutions is the State, not the actual
victim."'o The "plaintiff" is also the State and the victim is but the
"complaining witness."' Once a district attorney chooses to prosecute
the crime, the victim largely loses the ability to protect her identity,
protect her privacy, or halt the proceedings.112 State prosecutors often
will press forward with the prosecution if enough evidence exists to
convict without the victim's assistance, even if the prosecution itself
109. See SAFE HORIZON, AFTER SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RECOVERY GUIDE FOR
SURVIVORS 7, http://movingtoendsexualassault.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/After-
Sexual-Assault-A-Recovery-Guide-for-Survivors.pdf [https://perma.cc/S92T-6P6K]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (describing the need for sexual assault victims to "regain a
sense of control" over their world); Kaitlin A. Chivers-Wilson, Sexual Assault and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review of the Biological, Psychological and
Sociological Factors and Treatments, 9 McGILL J. MED. 111, 111-12 (2006)
("[S]uccessful recovery is subjective and measured by whether the survivor increases
his or her involvement in the present, acquires skills and attitudes to regain control over
his o[r] her life, forgive him or herself for guilt, shame and other negative cognitions,
and gain stress reduction skills for overall better functioning.") (citation omitted).
1 110. Criminal and Civil Justice, NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
https://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/criminal-and-civil-
justice [https://perma.cc/PJA4-6JYC] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (discussing differences
between criminal case and civil case from a victim's perspective, including the idea that
a "crime is considered 'a crime against the state"').
111. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 3, 27 n. 136 (1999) (describing inconsistencies between a domestic violence
restraining order case and concurrently pending criminal case because the "complaining
witness" victim was neither notified of nor asked to participate in the criminal trial:
"The parties to a criminal prosecution are the defendant and the state. The victim's role
is limited to that of a 'complaining witness"').
112. See id. at 40 n.205 (recounting a domestic violence prosecution that
proceeded over the express wishes of the victim: "Although the girlfriend did not wish
to press charges, the government proceeded and subpoenaed her to testify"); see also
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1221-22 (observing "several reasons for victims'
failure to report" sexual assault, including the recognition that they cannot control the
public prosecution of any reported crime even if "she wishes to conceal some aspect of
her own behavior-drug use, for example-immediately prior to the rape").
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increases the risk of violence to the victim.113 Moreover, criminal
prosecutions seek only offender-related relief in the form of
incarceration and other retributive punishment; little consideration is
given to the needs of the victim beyond "putting away the bad guy."ll4
Criminal prosecutions obviously are important, but for many sexual
assault victims who have just been disempowered by their assailants,
the feeling of powerlessness associated with a subsequent criminal
prosecution largely out of their control is the last thing victims want or
need."
C. The Benefits of SAPOs
Sexual assault protection orders provide meaningful relief to
victims that the criminal system cannot because they offer: (1)
procedural flexibility unavailable in the criminal system; (2)
prospective, victim-centered relief designed to deter future harm; and
(3) emotional empowerment experienced by victims who control the
process.
1. PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY
Civil protection orders are easier to obtain than criminal
convictions and criminal orders of protection. Whereas constitutional
due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal
conviction, civil protection orders can apply a lower standard of proof;
113. See Epstein, supra note 111, at 18 (criticizing bright line prosecutorial
policies not to drop domestic violence prosecutions regardless of the circumstance,
because "[a] no-drop policy may, in some cases, trigger a physical attack. Although
dropping charges in response to a batterer's threat allows him to retain control, forcible
prosecution can result in a deadly retaliation assault").
114. See Criminal and Civil Justice, supra note 110 (highlighting fact that the
goal of a criminal trial "is to hold defendant accountable to the state" and that the
victim has no "right to direct the prosecution of the case or to veto the prosecutor's
decisions"). While many District Attorney offices maintain victim liaison offices, many
of these offices are concerned primarily with administering state-run victims'
compensation funds. The goal of victim monetary compensation is laudable, but neither
offers the victim the ability to control the prosecution in any way nor any form of
prospective protection from the assailant. See id. (describing "State Crime Victim
Compensation" goals and procedures); see also Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at
472 ("Most victim compensation statutes require some form of Involvement with the
criminal justice system in order for the victim to pursue a compensation claim. Placing
the availability of civil remedies in the hands of the criminal justice process causes real
harm to victims . . . .").
115. See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1195 ("Victims often do
not report the rape, largely because they fear overbearing, hostile police, and-should a
trial ensue-vicious attacks on their character" which are out of their control) (citations
omitted); Chivers-Wilson, supra note 109, at 115 (highlighting the psychological need
for rape victims to regain control after an assault).
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in most states, a victim need only sustain proof by a preponderance of
the evidence.11 6 This lower standard of proof is critically important in
the sexual assault context because of the uniquely intimate and complex
circumstances surrounding sexual violence. In this context, extrinsic
evidence is often lacking, and
there are usually few, if any, eyewitnesses to . . . [sexual]
violence. Most of the events complained of in such matters
happen behind closed doors or during private
communications; as a result, most cases turn only on the trial
judge's assessment of the credibility of only two witnesses-
the plaintiff and the defendant." 7
As a result, district attorneys routinely decline to criminally prosecute
domestic violence and sexual assault cases because of their inability to
prove the cases beyond a reasonable doubt."' Yet while a victim may
not have the evidence necessary to sustain criminal charges, she may
have evidence to support a finding that she is in danger, or that a past
crime occurred, under a lower burden of proof." 9
Importantly, civil orders also can provide protection more quickly
than criminal orders of protection. In civil court, a temporary order can
be issued upon the victim's sworn statement, and a hearing for a
116. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.850 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-14-103 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a (2015); D.C. CODE § 16-1005
(2013); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/201 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 4005 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1503 (West 2016); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.378 (2009); N.M.R.A., RULE 1-066 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
31.2-01(4) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.763(2)(d) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
19A-11 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(b) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
5133(b) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.9(D) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.90.090(1)(a) (West 2007).
117. Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1176-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) (citations omitted).
118. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1196 ("Afraid that losing cases
will look bad on their records, prosecutors are excessively reluctant to prosecute
acquaintance rapists.").
119. Deborah Gartzke Goolsby, Using Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183, 1188-92 (1990) (attributing failure to prosecute and
convict offenders in simple rape cases on unattainably high burdens of proof and on
evidentiary issues tied to systemic male biases, including force requirements,
overreliance on prior relationship testimony, corroboration requirements, and fresh
complaint requirements); see Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1294-95 ("The
charge of massive, systemic bias against acquaintance rape victims rests at bottom on
three assumptions: . . . That the guilt of most acquaintance rapists can be proven
beyond a genuinely reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of unbiased factfinders.")
(citations omitted).
458 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
permanent order can be held shortly thereafter.120 In contrast, while a
temporary order can be granted in criminal cases in relatively short
order, a conviction and "permanent" criminal order can take months or
even years.121 Such expeditious relief is critical for victims of such
intimate crimes, because victims of sexual assault are often at greatest
risk of serious physical harm shortly after separation from an
assailant.122
2. PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
Further, civil orders of protection provide far more comprehensive
remedies than those available in criminal court. These remedies focus
on the future safety of the victim rather than the punishment of the
offender for past misconduct.'23 In addition to ordering the perpetrator
to stay away from and have no contact with the victim, civil orders can
120. See David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of
Protection: How Easing Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse
of the Process, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 88, 101 (2008) (explaining that civil
restraining order statutes "generally seek to provide a quick and simple mechanism by
which victims of domestic violence can obtain a judicial remedy," by inter alia,
requiring only "an affidavit or verified complaint for a temporary restraining order to
issue without notice") (citations omitted); see also Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining
Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of "Efficacy," 11 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 365 (2002) (observing that due process requirements mandate that
a hearing be held shortly after issuance of a temporary restraining order); Taylor et al.,
supra, at 83 ("After notice to the alleged abuser, a full hearing is held within a
relatively short period of time at which the alleged abuser may appear and defend the
action. An order of longer duration may then be entered; commonly one to two years is
entered.") (citations omitted).
121. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 472 ("[T]he criminal justice
process is too slow and poorly equipped to protect against the immediate devastating
consequences of assault.").
122. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 112 ("Because civil protection orders are
drafted specifically with victim assistance in mind, they are also designed to be more
victim-friendly than the criminal justice system. Court procedures, filing systems,
personnel, and hearings are tailored to ensure that the victim obtains the necessary
protections she needs. Additionally, the burden of proof in protection order hearings is
typically lower than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard used in the criminal
process.") (citations omitted); Mindlin & Reeves, supra note 77, at 20 (discussing
factors to consider in evaluating a victim's safety from an assailant, particularly in the
immediate aftermath of the sexual assault).
123. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8 at 476 ("Rape victims may also use
civil protective orders to insulate themselves form many of the negative social and
economic impacts of rape . . . ."); Jennifer Rios, Note: What's the Hold-Up? Making
the Case for Lifetime Orders of Protection in New York State, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 709, 716-18 (2006) (discussing protection orders as a source of protection for
victims).
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provide relief in the form of economic orders. 124 They can also require
that an assailant surrender firearms. 125 They can issue orders regarding
the possession and use of shared residences, automobiles, or other
personal effects or can order the assailant to vacate a shared
residence. 126 They also can require that the assailant pay the mortgage
or rent on the victim's residence or pay for victim's counsel. 127 They
can order that the assailant pay for expenses related to the violence such
as medical expenses, counseling expenses, temporary shelter or housing
expenses, and expenses to repair or replace damaged property. 128 Most
states have a catch-all provision that allows courts discretion to fashion
additional remedies specific to each victim. 129
124. Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 476 ("Rape victims may also use
civil protective orders . . . for limited restitution costs associated with rape."); ME.
STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007(I)-(L) (2016) (Maine "Protection from Abuse" Order providing
for monetary compensation related to the harassment or violence). A majority of
DVRO statutes provide for economic restitution in recognition of the likely economic
impact of fractures in a partnered relationship. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
18.66. 100(c)(12)-(14) (2014); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6342(a)(1) (West 2015); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(7) (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1045 (2013); IND. CODE. § 34-26-5-
9(c)(3)(D) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(11) (2015); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-15(2)(a)(vi) (West 2014).
125. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214(F)(2) (West 2016) (Ohio's
Civil Protection Order authorizing relinquishment of firearms); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 60.11(5) (West 2016) (Oklahoma Civil Protection Order authorizing same);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.123(5m) (West 2015-16) (Wisconsin Civil Harassment
Restraining Order authorizing same); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-15-201(2)(f) (West
2011) (Montana "Temporary Order of Protection" authorizing same if the gun was used
in the assault).
126. See Smith, supra note 38, at 100 ("[I]n some states, judges issuing civil
protection orders can include orders relating to child custody and visitation. They can
also require [the] person to seek counseling or drug or alcohol treatment, they can grant
the petitioner possession of the residence or other property, child support, or other
economic relief, and they can keep the respondent from accessing the petitioner's
personal information.") (citations omitted).
127. See id. at 121.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(b)(9) (2015) (catchall provision in
Alabama's domestic violence restraining order); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(7)
(2008) (catchall provision in New Mexico's domestic violence restraining order). These
catchall provisions can be fashioned in a way to protect sexual assault victims in ways
that are unique to their situation. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 112-13 ("Protection
orders may also assist victims seeking to have an assailant removed from their daily
environment, such as at their school, home, or place of employment. Many institutions,
such as housing authorities, schools, and employers, attempt to limit their potential
liability to the assailant by refraining from removing the assailant from the victim's
surroundings, unless acting pursuant to a court order. A civil protection order issued by
a court often gives the victim the ability to negotiate with these organizations, and it
may expedite the process for removing the assailant from the victim's daily life.")
(citations omitted).
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3. VICTIM EMPOWERMENT
The criminal justice system, by its very nature, focuses on
punishment of the offender for past acts first, burdens and benefits to
"the state" second, and the victim third (if at all)."'o This hierarchy can
make already vulnerable sexual assault victims feel even more
powerless. Prospective, victim-directed protection orders have the
opposite effect.
Studies show that victims who obtain civil protection orders
against their attackers subsequently experience increased
feelings of safety after obtaining the order. In addition,
research indicates that 'one of the most significant benefits of
seeking and obtaining an Order for Protection' is that it serves
to empower the victim by allowing her to initiate a course of
action after a dehumanizing attack. Moreover, victims often
report that civil protection orders were instrumental in helping
them recover and improve their overall feelings of well-being
after an attack.13 1
D. The Model for Success: The DVRO
Much like the sexual assault epidemic, increased awareness of the
domestic violence epidemic happened as a result of efforts during the
women's rights movement to shine a light on social injustices
perpetrated overwhelmingly against women. 132 The initial legislative
response-to modify existing criminal statutes-mirrored the response
130. See Epstein, supra note 111, at 4-5.
131. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 111, 113 (citations omitted) ("Additionally,
public safety may benefit as a result of civil protection orders for sexual assault victims.
If a victim feels safe, she is more likely to report the attack and to cooperate with law
enforcement agencies, which in turn allows the criminal justice system to operate more
efficiently. Finally, civil protection orders for sexual assault victims 'send a strong
message to the perpetrator and the community that sexual assault is not acceptable
behavior.' Such a message may actually serve as a deterrent to both the offender and
other potential sexual assailants.") (citations omitted).
132. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(3) (West 2010) (stating that one
of the underlying purposes of the Domestic Violence Act is to "recognize that the legal
system has ineffectively dealt with family violence in the past"); Smith, supra note 38,
at 99 ("By the late 1970s, the problem of domestic violence and the failure of
government to respond adequately were gaining recognition across the country. The
clear push by victims' advocates and feminists was to strengthen governmental
responses to domestic violence, especially in the criminal justice system.") (citations
omitted); Taylor et al., supra note 120, at 83-84 ("[Plrior to the enactment of domestic
violence statutes beginning in the 1970s, judicial process was largely unavailable to
victims as a practical remedy . . . .").
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to sexual assault awareness as well.' Unfortunately, these "reforms"
had little discernible impact, leading to advocacy efforts for the creation
of a civil legal remedy.' 34 A short discussion of this history is necessary
to provide context for the justification for similar civil legal remedies
for victims of sexual assault.
1. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC
Like sexual assault, domestic violence is a nationwide (indeed,
worldwide) epidemic affecting millions of individuals regardless of age,
economic status, race, religion, or education. According to the National
Network to End Domestic Violence and the National Intimate Partner
and Sexual Violence Survey, more than one in three women "have
experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking" by a partner
during adulthood,135 and approximately one in twelve men "has
experienced sexual violence other than rape" by a partner.136 On
average, three women are killed by a current or former intimate partner
each day in the United States;137 since 1976, nearly one-third of all
female homicide victims have been killed by their intimate partner. '38
Approximately seven million people each year in the United States are
raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or former spouse or
partner.139 Approximately 37% of women seeking injury-related
treatment in hospital emergency rooms were treated for injuries
inflicted by a current or former spouse or partner.'40 A twenty-four-
133. See JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 8-10 (1996),
http://www./ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/34SM-MNDG]
(discussing prevalent theory in the 1970s that the proper response to domestic violence
was the criminalize the act in order to increase awareness and public response by
establishing it as a public criminal act rather than a private matter).
134. See id.
135. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE FACT SHEET,
http://nnedv.org/downloads/Policy/AD14/AD14_DVSAFactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN3F-JPUQ] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
136. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 42 (2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report20l0-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PA8U-PJZM].
137. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 135.
138. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.
1993-2004, at 7 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5FE-ZMRF].
139. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 135.
140. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT FACT SHEET,
http://www.worldpulse.com/sites/default/files/post/3180/8675/postdocument/2ec5156
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hour nationwide survey conducted in 2008 found that over 60,000
victims of domestic violence received services in a single day.141
As with sexual assault, partner violence exacts an enormous
economic toll. The cost of intimate partner violence annually exceeds
$5.8 billion, including $4.1 billion in direct health care expenses.142
Between one-quarter and one-half of domestic violence victims report
that they lost a job, at least in part, due to domestic violence.' 43 The
estimated annual cost to employers from lost employee productivity in
the United States is estimated at $13 billion.'" The negative impact of
partner violence is especially harmful and far-reaching for children.
Approximately 15.5 million children are exposed to domestic violence
every year.'45 Men exposed to domestic violence as children are 3.8
times more likely than other men to perpetrate domestic violence as
adults.'4 6 Women exposed to domestic violence as children are 150
times more likely to abuse their children.'47 Children that are exposed
to violence are far more likely to attempt suicide, abuse drugs and
alcohol, engage in teenage prostitution, and commit sexual assault
crimes.148
40cf69abf62bb9059fe4c84d2/dvsafactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4PB-M6X8] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2017).
141. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COUNTS 2008: A 24-HOUR CENSUS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTERS AND SERVICES 3
(2009),
http://nnedv.org/downloads/Census/DVCounts2008/DVCountsO8_ReportColor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6RG-34PT].
142. NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. THE BNA SPECIAL REPORT SERIES ON WORK & FAMILY, VIOLENCE AND
STRESS: THE WORK/FAMILY CONNECTION 3 (1990). Women who experience domestic
violence are more likely to experience spells of unemployment, have health problems,
and receive welfare benefits. Nearly half of all homeless women and children have
experienced domestic violence. See NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 135.
145. Renee McDonald et al., Estimating the Number of American Children
Living in Partner-Violent Families, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 137, 142 (2006) (referring to
a 2001 study).
146. JEFFREY L. EDLESON, NAT'L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, EMERGING RESPONSES TO CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2011),
http://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/ARChildrensExposure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RL5G-N49P].
147. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 27 (3d ed. 2003).
148. David A. Wolfe et al., Strategies to Address Violence in the Lives of High
Risk Youth, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN
OF BATTERED WOMEN (Einat Peled et al., eds. 1995); see also FAMILY VIOLENCE
PREVENTION FUND, THE FACTS ON CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://police.ucsf.edu/system/files/domesticviolencechildren.pdf
[https://perma.cclP2X3-5P8U] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
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2. THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO ADDRESS THE
EPIDEMIC
Before the rise of the women's rights movement, "[i]t was
generally accepted that treatment, rather than criminal prosecution, was
the best solution for problems in the family," including family
violence.' 49 "The legislature sought not to punish but to provide
'practical help.""s But by as early as 1962, states such as New York
were under increasing pressure from constituents to address the so-
called "emerging" problem of domestic violence.1' The initial focus of
lobbying efforts by victims' advocates were aimed at strengthening
governmental responses to domestic violence via the criminal justice
system.' Rather than enact any new legislation, however, the common
governmental response was to remind those in the criminal justice
system that physical violence, including domestic violence, was
criminal activity that should be punished as such.'
These "reforms" had little discernible impact. Across the country
it became clear that police, prosecutors, and criminal courts were slow
to respond to the problem, and by the late 1970s this failure of
government to respond adequately had gained widespread recognition
across the country.' 54 Moreover, as the notion of the "cycle of
violence" inherent in abusive relationships became more widely
understood and accepted, government officials began to recognize the
limits of the backward-looking criminal justice system to adequately
address the problem. 55
3. THE SUCCESS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDERS
As a result of this growing recognition, advocates shifted their
approach and began to advocate for legislation that would allow victims
to obtain relief in civil court, including prospective relief to prevent
future violence.' 56 These efforts were wildly successful. In 1976, only
149. Smith, supra note 38, at 98-99.
150. Id. at 99.
151. Id. at 98.
152. Id. at 99 (summarizing early history of domestic violence reform
movement as one primarily focused on criminalization of the offense).
153. See Smith, supra note 38, at 148; see generally Fagan, supra note 133.
154. Smith, supra note 38, at 99 ("By the late 1970s, the problem of domestic
violence and the failure of government to respond adequately were gaining recognition
across the country.").
155. See id.
156. Id. at 99 ("Across the country, police, prosecutors, and criminal courts
were slow to respond to the problem, so advocates of battered women began to push for
legislation that would allow victims relief in civil court.").
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two states had civil protection orders for domestic violence victims; 157
"I[b]y 1994, all fifty states [and the District of Columbia] had adopted
some form of domestic violence civil protection order legislation.""
Today, "[s]tates are repeatedly revisiting their protection order
legislation to expand protection, to reduce the cost of obtaining orders,
to streamline the process, and to create state and national registries for
the protection orders."1 59
The practical success of these legislative changes is difficult to
understate. In the years since domestic violence prevention orders have
been widely available across the country, non-fatal intimate partner
violence against women has decreased 63% and the number of women
killed by an intimate partner has decreased 24%.1' Moreover, studies
show that the availability of DVROs help victims escape the economic
devastation experienced by so many victims in the weeks and months
following an abusive episode.'16  This economic impact has particular
resonance for the sexual assault survivor community, given then
devastating economic spiral felt by so many victims in the months
following an attack.1 62 This tangible benefit of carefully crafted
restraining orders specifically for victims of domestic violence provides
hope for the possible success of SAPOs.
4. THE LIMITS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Non-partner sexual assault, though different in many respects from
domestic violence, shares many of the same unique characteristics that
necessitated the creation of a civil protective remedy for domestic
violence. Like domestic violence, sexual assault is a nationwide
epidemic affecting primarily (though not exclusively) women that only
received widespread attention as such during the women's rights
157. Ko, supra note 120, at 362.
158. Smith, supra note 38, at 100; see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes
and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 810 (1993) ("Currently, all fifty states plus
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico male civil protection orders available to
victims of domestic violence.").
159. Smith, supra note 38, at 100.
160. Monica N. Modi et al., The Role of Violence Against Women Act in
Addressing Intimate Partner Violence: A Public Health Issue, 23 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH
253, 254 (2014).
161. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at 476.
162. Id. at 473 ("What the legal system offers [sexual assault] victims should,
therefore, be designed to meet their most immediate needs: preventing the traumatic
economic and psychological downward spiral that frequently begins within the first six
months after assault.").
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movement."' Like domestic violence, sexual assault often occurs
behind closed doors and involves private, intimate circumstances only
truly known to two people-the victim and the assailant. As a result,
district attorneys decline to prosecute the vast majority of sexual assault
cases due to the lack of extrinsic evidence, leaving victims with no
criminal remedies. 16 4 Like domestic violence, legislatures have
attempted to address the problem by modifying existing criminal codes,
but lingering prejudice and ambivalence-combined with the rigidity of
the criminal system-has rendered traditional legal avenues all but
useless for sexual assault victims. 165 Like domestic violence, advocacy
efforts have led to the creation of civil protective orders offering
prospective, victim-centered remedies for victims of sexual assault. 166
Unlike domestic violence, however, these efforts have not borne
fruit throughout the country. Currently, only twenty-eight states and the
District of Columbia offer any type of civil protective remedy for
victims of sexual assault, and many of these remedies-such as
California's Civil Harassment Restraining Order-are broadly drafted
and governed by procedures better suited for neighbor disputes and bar
fights than for the unique circumstances of sexual assault. 167
One must be careful, however, not to draw unwarranted parallels
between domestic violence and sexual assault. Legal literature is replete
with analyses of the causes, effects, and remedies for domestic violence
(and with good reason), and the temptation exists to simply group the
decidedly less considered subject of sexual assault in with the analysis
of domestic violence for all of the reasons discussed above. But, at least
for purposes of discussing appropriate civil protection order remedies,
two important distinctions must be drawn:
(1) Presence of past conduct and other extrinsic evidence: Often,
though not always, domestic violence incidents are
accompanied by a long history of past abusive conduct. Given
the "cycle of violence" in abusive relationships, petitioners in
domestic violence cases often can point to a pattern of abuse as
evidence of the need for prospective relief. Many DVRO
petitions also are accompanied by some form of extrinsic
evidence of physical trauma, including evidence of bruising or
163. Id. at 467.
164. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 9, at 1196 ("Afraid that losing cases
will look bad on their records, prosecutors are excessively reluctant to prosecute
acquaintance rapists.").
165. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 108; Seidman & Vickers, supra note 8, at
468-69.
166. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 112.
167. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.6 (West 2014); see also ABA
COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22.
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cuts. Sexual assault, on the other hand, often lacks both indicia
of extrinsic evidence. While a victim may have a long-term
acquaintance relationship with her assailant, the attack itself
may take the form of an isolated incident. Moreover, sexual
assault victims may very well lack the opportunity or ability to
forcefully fend off an attacker, either from their incapacitation
as a result of intoxication or fear resulting from threats of
deadly violence. Requiring a showing of past conduct or
extrinsic evidence of resistance, therefore, would ignore the
realities of many incidents of sexual assault.
(2) Likelihood of future harm: Restraining orders provide
prospective relief against predicted future behavior, so courts
naturally consider the likelihood of future harm absent the
issuance of an order. The likelihood of future harm is often
presumed in domestic violence cases, because the existence of a
partnered relationship between the victim and assailant virtually
assures at the least chance of close physical contact in the
future. The same may not necessarily be the case for sexual
assault.
III. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER REGIMES
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have offered
restraining orders specifically designed for victims of domestic violence
since 1994.168 However, as of 2016, only twenty-nine states offer any
type of prospective relief for sexual assault victims, and the vast
majority of these statutes are neither specifically tailored to sexual
assault nor offer meaningful, effective relief opportunities for sexual
assault victims.169 The landscape is changing, with several states
expanding CHROs to include sexual assault or enacting separate
SAPOs.1 7 0 But the pace of change has been slow.
This section provides an overview of the two main types of
restraining orders available to victims of sexual assault: catchall
CHROs and narrowly tailored SAPOs. In doing so, this section
contrasts California's catchall CHRO with Washington's narrowly
tailored SAPO.
168. See Smith, supra note 38, at 100 ("By 1994, all fifty states had adopted
some form of domestic violence civil protection order legislation.").
169. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22.
170. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010) (Illinois'
Sexual Assault Protection Order); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 1 (2010) (amendment
of Massachusetts' harassment restraining order to provide specialized protections for
sexual assault); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.020 (West 2007) (Washington's Sexual
Assault Protection Order).
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A. CHRO Statutes Available to Sexual Assault Victims
According to the ABA Commission on Domestic and Sexual
Violence, twenty-nine states currently offer some form of civil
protection order remedies for victims of sexual assault."' But many of
these statutes merely define "sexual assault" as one of the many types
of "harassment" for which relief may be granted, including annoying
neighbor conduct, bar fights, and landlord-tenant disputes.'72 These
statutes provide the type of "catchall" relief that ignores the seriousness
of sexual assault and the unique needs of sexual assault victims.
States employing catchall CHROs to address sexual assault
include, inter alia: California (applicable to a person who has been
harassed, sexually assaulted, or threatened with violence);' 73 Minnesota
(applicable to "a person who is a victim of harassment"); 74 New
Mexico (applicable to a person who will suffer "immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage"); "' North Dakota (defining
"disorderly conduct" and offering relief for "intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety,
security, or privacy of another person");1 7 6 Oklahoma (applicable to
"victim of domestic abuse, . . . stalking, . . . harassment, [or] . . .
rape");1 77 South Dakota (applicable to "victim of stalking, . . . [or]
physical injury as a result of an assault, or . . . a crime of violence as
defined in the [criminal code]");'78 Vermont (applicable to a victim of
"stalking or sexual assault"); 7 1 Virginia (applicable to cases involving a
"conviction or threat of "an act of violence, force, or threat");so and
Wisconsin (applicable where "the respondent has engaged in
harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner"). 8 1 And
while these catchall statutes have inherent limits in their applicability to
sexual assault victims, it must be remembered that these statutes
provide at least a possible relief avenue for sexual assault victims.
Twenty-one states provide no such avenue for relief at all.
California's Civil Harassment Restraining Order provides a perfect
example of the limits of catchall CHROs to the unique needs of sexual
assault victims. A CHRO is available to "[a] person who has suffered
171. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22.
172. Id.
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 527.6(a)(1) (West 2014).
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(2) (West 2014).
175. N.M.R.A., RULE 1-066(B)(1) (2016).
176. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(1) (2016).
177. 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 60.2 (West 2016).
178. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-8 (2011).
179. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5133(a) (2011).
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10(a) (2014).
181. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(3)(a)(2) (West 2015-16).
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harassment,"182 which is defined as: (1) unlawful violence (including
any assault and battery, such as sexual assault); (2) a credible threat of
violence; or (3) a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose.' A "[c]ourse of conduct is a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose . . . .184 Although
this definition is disjunctive, suggesting that no "course of conduct"
requirement exists for the unlawful violence or credible threat of
violence prongs, confusion exists over whether "unlawful violence"
like sexual assault also requires a course of conduct, such as a repeated
pattern of sexual assault."8
Upon filing a petition for an injunction, a plaintiff may receive a
temporary restraining order for a period of up to fifteen to twenty-two
days whether or not the defendant has been notified of the petition.' 86
To receive a temporary restraining order, the plaintiff must show both:
(1) "reasonable proof of harassment," and (2) "that great or irreparable
harm would result to the [plaintiff]" without the order.' This second,
prospective prong requires a showing that a real threat of future harm
exists, and that harm must be the same type of harm already inflicted.'
In other words, a victim of sexual assault must demonstrate a real threat
that she will suffer another sexual assault in the future.
Within fifteen to twenty-two days of the issuance of the temporary
restraining order, the court will hold a hearing on the petition for a
permanent injunction.'89 "If the judge finds by clear and convincing
evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an [injunction] shall issue
prohibiting the harassment."'90
California's CHRO statute highlights three critical deficiencies in
catchall statutes lumping sexual assault in with merely annoying
conduct. By treating sexual assault less like domestic violence and more
like prank calls, California has: (1) created confusion about when,
whether, and to what extent its CHRO statute applies to victims of
sexual assault; (2) required proof of elements, such as a repeated
pattern of past conduct and a reasonable likelihood of the same type of
harm occurring in the future, that are inapplicable to sexual assault; and
182. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a)(1) (West 2014).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Harris v. Stampolis, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10-11, 13-15 (2016).
186. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(d), (f).
187. Id. § 527.6(d).
188. See id.
189. Id. § 527.6(g)-(j) (the plaintiff can renew the statute every five years).
190. Id. § 537.6(i) (emphasis added).
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(3) imposed a burden of proof that is not practically achievable for an
intimate, private violent act like sexual assault.
B. SAPO Statutes
Several states have amended their civil protection order statutes in
recent years specifically to include a sexual assault protection order
available specifically to victims of rape and sexual assault. Notably,
Illinois and Washington included identical language into the "purpose"
section of their respective SAPO Acts to underscore the urgent need to
respond to the sexual assault crisis:
Sexual assault is the most heinous crime against another
person short of murder. Sexual assault inflicts humiliation,
degradation, and terror on victims. According to the FBI, a
woman is raped every six minutes in the United States. Rape
is recognized as the most underreported crime; estimates
suggest that only one in seven rapes is reported to authorities.
Victims who do not report the crime still desire safety and
protection from future interactions with the offender. Some
cases in which the rape is reported are not prosecuted. In
these situations, the victim should be able to seek a civil
remedy requiring that the offender stay away from the victim.
It is the intent of the legislature that the sexual assault
protection order created by this chapter be a remedy for
victims who do not qualify for a domestic violence order of
protection. 191
Washington's SAPO statute provides a remarkable contrast to the
unworkable CHRO in California. Unlike California's CHRO, a
petitioner under Washington's SAPO need only allege
the existence of nonconsensual sexual conduct or
nonconsensual sexual penetration[,] . . . accompanied by an
affidavit made under oath stating the specific statements or
actions made at the same time of the sexual assault or
subsequently thereafter, which give rise to a reasonable fear
of future dangerous acts, for which relief is sought.' 92
191. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2007) (Washington's Sexual
Assault Protection Order); see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010)
(Illinois' Sexual Assault Protection Order).
192. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.020.
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Moreover, a petitioner need only prove the first element-that a
nonconsensual sexual contact occurred-by a preponderance of the
evidence.193
This statute alleviates the myriad problems associated with catchall
CHROs like California's Civil Harassment Restraining Order. First, it
eliminates any confusion about the purpose or applicability of the
statute to sexual assault, which creates public awareness of the
availability of such relief and protects victims from any misdirected
opposition by opponents of frivolous litigation. Second, it requires only
allegations and proof of elements applicable to sexual assault: namely,
that a sexual assault occurred and that the victim reasonably fears for
her future safety. Third, it requires a lower burden of proof in
recognition both of the lack of extrinsic evidence in sexual assault cases
and the central governmental interest in eliminating sexual assault. As
demonstrated in the next section, this lower burden of proof not only
makes prospective relief practically available to sexual assault victims
but also satisfies constitutional due process.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
Notwithstanding the clear need for civil protection remedies to fill
the gaps where the criminal justice system fails, many courts and
commentators express concern over the perceived lack of due process
guarantees for respondents in restraining order hearings.194 Given that a
protection order seeks a public court judgment of criminal acts, and that
violation of the order itself is a crime, some argue that domestic
violence and sexual assault protection order statutes unjustly use an
equitable proceeding to punish criminal behavior, thus depriving the
accused of the due process rights to which he or she would otherwise
be entitled.'95 As one commentator explained, "[the] Legislature
cannot, by a mere change of name or form, convert that which is in its
nature a prosecution for a crime into a civil proceeding and thus
deprive parties of their rights to a trial by jury."1 9 6
193. See Roake v. Delman, 377 P.3d 258, 260, 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)
(finding that Washington's Sexual Assault Protection Order requires a petitioner to
allege, but not prove, fear of future harm).
194. See, e.g., Cesare v. Cesare, 694 A.2d 603, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997), rev'd 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998) (opining that protection orders
"transmogrify ... crimes into some lesser offense not a 'crime' . . . to circumvent the
protections normally accorded an accused in a criminal case"); Hutton, supra note 34,
at 104 (calling for a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in domestic violence
restraining order cases).
195. Heleniak, supra note 34, at 1009-10, 1014, 1024 (advocating for all
domestic violence cases to be handled in criminal court with criminal procedures and
burdens of proof).
196. Id. at 1009 (quoting 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1071 (1998)).
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These constitutional concerns typically take two forms: (1)
concerns that lower burdens of proof to adjudicate what is essentially
criminal activity unconstitutionally deprives the accused of procedural
protections; and (2) concerns that the more punitive provisions of civil
protection orders, particularly those impinging upon other substantive
constitutional rights, present a quasi-criminal "punishment" to the
accused that requires adjudication by a jury. However, even those
questioning the procedural sufficiency of such orders acknowledge that,
"[r]egardless of how high the stakes undoubtedly are for the accused
facing domestic [and sexual] violence charges, the victims of genuine
abuse have even more at risk."'
These tensions are real and merit serious discussion when
considering the types of procedural protections to afford respondents in
civil protection order hearings, and the types of relief available for
petitioners. As demonstrated below, these dual concerns over
appropriate burdens of proof and available remedies are interrelated and
cannot be considered effectively in isolation. Any such discussion must
be informed by the three-part balancing test announced in Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine what due process protections are constitutionally
required in so-called "quasi-criminal" proceedings.'98 The next section
analyzes this test with respect to domestic violence and sexual assault
protection orders as it relates to constitutionally sufficient burdens of
proof and available prospective remedies.
A. Burdens of Proof and Available Remedies in "Quasi-Criminal"
Proceedings: Mathews v. Eldridge
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 99 Courts recognize two types of due process protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment: substantive due process and procedural
due process.200 The term "substantive due process" refers to "the nature
of the potential deprivation and the adequacy of the government's
reasoning. "201 In other words, "substantive due process" encompasses
the nature of an individual's life, liberty, or property interest, and the
197. Hutton, supra note 34, at 118; see also Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390,
392 (N.J. 1998) (PODVA was passed, after all, because thousands of New Jersey
citizens were being "regularly beaten, tortured, and in some cases even killed by their
spouses or cohabitants") (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
198. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
200. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
545 (3d ed. 2006).
201. Hutton, supra note 34, at 103.
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government's interest in depriving an individual of that interest. 202 The
greater the nature of the individual's interest, the more compelling the
government's interest must be before it can constitutionally deprive an
individual of that interest.20
The term "procedural due process . . . refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty or property."20 As with substantive due process, the greater the
liberty interest at issue, the greater the procedural due process
protections are required. One such procedural due process protection is
the burden of persuasion in government proceedings. The Supreme
Court has recognized a "continuum [of] three standards or levels of
proof for different types of cases." 20 5 "Civil cases, which involve
monetary disputes where society is generally thought to have little
interest in the outcome, are at one extreme." 206 These cases are
governed by a "preponderance of the evidence" burden of persuasion,
which requires only that the movant prove that it is "more likely than
not" that the alleged conduct occurred.20 7 Some courts have referred to
this low standard as the "51-49" standard. 208 At the other extreme are
criminal cases, "in which the interests at stake for the defendant are so
high" that the government must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the alleged conduct occurred.209 In these cases, "society imposes almost
the entire risk of error upon itself." 2 10
Certain civil cases fall between these two extremes, due to the
competing interests at stake. 2 1' The Supreme Court has considered the
constitutional sufficiency of burdens of persuasion in a number of these
"quasi-criminal" contexts, including deportation cases, denaturalization
proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, and parental termination
proceedings.2 12
In considering whether the adoption of a particular burden of
persuasion adheres to constitutional due process principles, the
Supreme Court articulated a balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 13
Recognizing that due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting CHEMERINSKY, supra note 200).
205. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
206. Hutton, supra note 34, at 108-09 (citations omitted).
207. See id. at 108-10.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1996);
Jones v. Poole, 2008 WL 4054415, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2008).
209. Hutton, supra note 34, at 109.
210. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
211. See Hutton, supra note 34, at 109.
212. See id.
213. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
472
2017:429 The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders 473
protections as the particular situation demands," 2 14 the Mathews Court
created a test, which requires consideration of three factors:
1) "[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official
action; "
2) "[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and"
3) "[T]he Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail." 2 15
As explained by one commentator:
The three Mathews factors are interactive; the more important
the private interest at stake, the greater the state's obligation
to ensure that risk of erroneous deprivation is low.
Conversely, the less important the individual's private
interest, and the more important that of the state, the greater
the risk of wrongful deprivation the state is allowed to
tolerate.216
B. Application of the Mathews Balancing Test to Quasi-Criminal
Proceedings
The Supreme Court applied these flexible factors to a variety of
"quasi-criminal" contexts in the years immediately after Mathews. A
brief summary of how these factors are applied in different contexts is
helpful to better understand how the factors should be applied to sexual
assault protection orders.
1. CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
In Addington v. Texas,217 an appellant challenged his involuntary
and indefinite civil commitment after a psychiatric examiner found that
he was "mentally ill and require[d] hospitalization in a mental
hospital." 2 18 The medical examiner's finding was later upheld at trial
214. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
215. Id. at 349 (holding that due process did not require an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination of government disability benefits).
216. See Hutton, supra note 34, at 106-07 (citations omitted).
217. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
218. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
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under Texas' "preponderance-of-the-evidence standard" for civil
commitment hearings.219
Relying on Mathews, the Supreme Court found the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard inadequate given the serious liberty
deprivation in civil commitment cases, and held that constitutional due
process required a showing by clear and convincing evidence:
One typical use of the [intermediate] standard is in civil cases
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those
cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of
money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to
the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously
by increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof. Similarly, this
Court has used the 'clear, unequivocal and convincing'
standard of proof to protect particularly important individual
interests in various civil cases.220
The Court found the clear and convincing standard necessary and
adequate to "strike[] a fair balance between the rights of the individual
and the legitimate concerns of the state."221
2. PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
In Santosky v. Kramer,222 the Supreme Court applied Mathews in
holding that constitutional due process required a showing by clear and
convincing evidence in parental termination proceedings.223 Weighing
heavily in the Court's decision was the presence of a fundamental
liberty interest: the right to parent one's own children. 224 The presence
of this fundamental right, the Court concluded, mandated that greater
219. Id. at 432-33.
220. Id. at 424. Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted that in addition
to the obvious liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding, "it is
indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of
probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to
the individual." Id. at 425-26.
221. Id. at 431.
222. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 747. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated the Supreme
Court's "historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life
is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 753
(citations omitted). Justice Blacknun argued that the protection of this fundamental
liberty interest becomes even more important when the family situation is less than
ideal, stating that: "When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753-54.
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procedural protections, including higher burdens of proof, be afforded
the respondents.225 This case highlighted the fact that Mathews analyses
can implicate both procedural and substantive due process concerns. As
the "right to custody [of one's child] is deemed a fundamental right,
substantive due process requires that the government prove that
terminating custody is necessary to achieve a compelling [state
interest]. "1226
3. REVOCATION OF MEDICAL LICENSES
Applying the Mathews test in a different context, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey rejected a constitutional due process challenge to
New Jersey's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in medical
license revocation proceedings. 227 The court found that:
From a constitutional standpoint, the clear and convincing
standard has been found to be required as a matter of due
process when the threatened loss resulting from civil
proceedings is comparable to the consequences of a criminal
proceeding in the sense that it takes away liberty or
permanently deprives individuals of interests that are clearly
fundamental or significant to personal welfare.228
The court also addressed the risk of erroneous deprivation prong,
observing that a higher burden of proof may be required where "the
subject matter itself is intrinsically complex and not readily amenable to
objective assessment." 2 29  "These situations," the court noted,
"reasonably call for an allocation and enhancement of the burden of
proof to compensate for the difficulties encountered in determining the
contested issues."230 By contrast, the issues in a medical licensing case
do not require such a heightened standard of proof; "[w]hile these
standards are broad, they are capable of objective measurement."23 1 in
other words, "[t]he relative transparency of the factual issues at stake
lowers the risk of erroneous deprivation enough to make a
preponderance of the evidence sufficient under Mathews." 232
225. Id. at 747.
226. Hutton, supra note 34, at 107 (quoting CHEMERINSKY, supra note 200, at
546).
227. See In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 16-17 (N.J. 1982).
228. Id. at 13.
229. Id. at 16.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 15.
232. Hutton, supra note 34, at 110. Some have applied the Court's reasoning
in Polk to argue for a heightened burden of proof in domestic violence actions, given
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4. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS
In 2009, the Superior Court of New Jersey applied these factors to
domestic violence restraining order proceedings. In Crespo v.
Crespo,233 the Court considered a challenge to the state's Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), which permitted findings of domestic
violence through the application of the lower "preponderance" standard
instead of an intermediate "clear and convincing" standard. 234 At trial,
the judge agreed with the respondent husband's constitutional argument
that the preponderance standard was "constitutionally inadequate" given
the severe personal and professional consequences of domestic violence
restraining orders.235
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the preponderance
standard enunciated by the New Jersey legislature in adopting the
DVPA passed constitutional muster. 236 At the outset, the court observed
that, "[d]omestic violence actions, by their very nature, naturally pit the
first and third Mathews factors, that is, victims' interests in being
protected from domestic violence against defendants' liberty interests in
being free to say what they wish and go where they please." 237
Persuaded by the New Jersey legislature's "unmistakable expressions of
public policy" demonstrating that the legislature "obviously viewed the
victims' interests as highly important and of far greater weight than
defendants' interests," the court concluded that:
the limits imposed upon a defendant's private interests carry
far less weight in the Mathews analysis than does the
governmental interest in eliminating domestic violence and in
affording immediate and effective protection to victims of
domestic violence.238
With regard to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, the court discussed the uniqueness of domestic violence:
there are usually few, if any, eyewitnesses to marital discord
or domestic violence. Most of the events complained of in
such matters happen behind closed doors or during private
communications; as a result, most cases turn only on the trial
the private, intimate nature of the proceedings, and thus the fact that the evidence is
often "intrinsically complex and not readily amenable to objective assessment." Id.
233. 972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
234. Id. at 1171-72.
235. Id. at 1175.
236. Id. at 1177.
237. Id. at 1176.
238. Id.
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judge's assessment of the credibility of only two witnesses -
the plaintiff and the defendant.239
The court reasoned that,
a clear-and-convincing standard would saddle victims of
domestic violence with a burden that would often foreclose
relief in many deserving cases. When the testimony of the
plaintiff is pitted against the testimony of the defendant, with
no other corroborating testimony or evidence, a plaintiff
would likely have difficulty sustaining the sterner standard
urged by defendant here.24
While the court acknowledged that
judges-being human-may at times err in assessing which of
the two contestants has told the truth; we do not, however,
view Mathews as requiring a burden of persuasion that more
effectively eliminates the chance of a mistaken adjudication at
the steep price of permitting countless more meritorious
claims to be lost at the hands of the clear-and-convincing
evidence standard.241
Notably, the court in Crespo applied the Mathews risk of
erroneous deprivation prong in precisely the opposite fashion from the
court in In re Polk,242 finding that the relative lack of clear evidence in
domestic violence proceedings required application of a lower burden
of proof to eliminate "the steep price of permitting countless more
meritorious claims to be lost at the hands of the clear-and-convincing
evidence standard." 2 43
239. Id. at 1176-77 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 1777. Some commentators have criticized the Crespo court's
consideration of the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, because
it applied this factor in precisely the opposite way it was applied in Mathews, Polk, and
the lower court in Crespo. See Hutton, supra note 34, at 116-17 ("The court cited the
scarcity of objective proof and the difficulty of making determinations based upon
anything more than intuitive judgments about credibility as factors weighing against a
higher standard of proof . . . In effect, the superior court seems to have held that,
because the risk of erroneous deprivation in domestic violence cases is so high, the
court ought to employ a lower standard of proof, contrary to the holding in
Mathews.").
241. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1177.
242. 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1982).
243. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1177. Cf. In re Polk, 449 A.2d at 16 (calling for an
"enhancement of the burden of proof to compensate for the difficulties encountered in
determining . . . . contested issues" that are not "readily amenable to objective
assessment").
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Critics of lower burdens of proof in the restraining order context
claim that the Crespo court applied the risk of erroneous deprivation
factor
in precisely the opposite way it was applied in Mathews . . . .
In effect, the superior court seems to have held that, because
the risk of erroneous deprivation in domestic violence cases is
so high, the court ought to employ a lower standard of proof,
contrary to the holding in Mathews.2"
But this reasoning only considers the second Mathews factor in
isolation and ignores that the three-prong test is interactive and requires
a balancing of competing interests. Even where the risk of erroneous
deprivation is low, a heightened burden of proof may be required
where, on balance, the potential private liberty interest far outweighs
the governmental interest. 245 By contrast, where the governmental
interest in curbing the widespread epidemic of domestic violence is
significantly more important than the private interest affected
(restricting one's freedom of movement from a single individual), then
the balance of interests may still tilt in favor of a lower burden of proof
even if a higher burden of proof could "effectively eliminatef] the
chance of a mistaken adjudication . . . ."246 Simply put, some interests,
such as the elimination and prevention of domestic violence, are simply
too great to risk imposing "a burden that would often foreclose relief in
many deserving cases," particularly when the punishment imposed is
relatively minor in scope.247
The Washington Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion
when a similar Mathews due process challenge was made against that
state's Domestic Violence Prevention Act.248 In State v. Karas,249 the
court applied the Mathews factors to decide that ex parte protection
orders were constitutionally proper because they did
not protect merely the 'private right' of the person named as
petitioner in the order. . . . [but] the public . . . interest in
244. Hutton, supra note 34, at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
245. For example, in the civil commitment context, the serious restriction on
all freedom of movement caused by involuntary commitment far outweighs the
relatively less important governmental interest of protecting people from themselves.
Thus, even where the risk of erroneous deprivation is relative low, given objective
professional psychiatric evaluation procedures, a heightened burden of proof applies.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
246. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1178.
247. Id. at 1177-78.
248. State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
249. 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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preventing domestic violence[;J . . . [because] the minor
curtailment of [defendant's] liberty imposed by the protection
order [was minor;] and [because of] the significant public and
governmental interest in reducing the potential for irreparable
injury, the Act's provision of notice and a hearing before a
neutral magistrate satisfies the inherently flexible demands of
procedural due process.25
C. Application of Mathews to Sexual Assault Protection Orders
As the discussion above demonstrates, the Mathews balancing test
is designed to be considered holistically and flexibly. The greater the
potential liberty deprivation, the greater the procedural protections and
burdens of proof-particularly when that liberty deprivation impinges
upon a fundamental constitutional right.25' Conversely, when the
potential liberty deprivation does not impinge upon a basic fundamental
liberty, courts are more willing to opt for lower burdens of proof-
particularly when the interests of the petitioner implicate important
societal objectives.25
While one may feel inclined to automatically treat SAPOs like
DVROs because sexual assault more closely resembles domestic
violence than civil commitment, parental termination, or medical
license revocation, a more nuanced analysis of each Mathews factor is
required.
1. THE PRIVATE INTERESTS AFFECTED
As with DVROs, the most common and immediate private interest
affected by the grant of a SAPO is a limitation on the respondent
accused's freedom of movement.253 At its core, restraining orders are
"stay away" orders requiring an offender to stay away from the
petitioner. While this official action certainly represents a deprivation
of some degree of liberty interests, requiring someone to stay away
250. Id. (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
251. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982) (deprivation
of fundamental constitutional right to raise one's own children); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1979) (deprivation of basic liberty in involuntary civil
commitment proceedings).
252. See Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1177 (limits loss of freedom of movement from a
"stay away" order to prevent future acts of domestic violence); In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7,
16-17 (N.J. 1982).
253. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 22
(summarizing remedies under twenty-nine state statutes with harassment restraining
order mechanisms for sexual assault victims, each of which includes some form of
"stay away" or "no contact" order).
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from one person falls far short of the type of liberty deprivation felt in
a civil commitment hearing.254
Of course, that liberty deprivation may be felt more acutely
depending on the circumstances, especially if the petitioner and
respondent live, work, or attend school together. But any temptation to
employ a flexible or changing burden of proof to respond to these
special circumstances must be rejected for two reasons. First, it is
unconstitutional. Implicitly changing the burden of proof in a statutory
mechanism renders the statute impermissibly vague and denies the
parties the protections afforded them by their representatives.255
Second, any situation where a respondent's freedom of movement may
be more greatly restricted due to a "stay away" order naturally involves
a riskier and more dangerous situation for the petitioner, a
counterbalancing consideration justifying the liberty deprivation upon
appropriate proof. The closer and more regularly the parties have
contact with one another-at home, school, or work-the greater the
risk to the sexual assault victim that she will be re-traumatized by the
offender's presence (or worse) if a restraining order does not issue.256
With respect to the private interest affected vis-a-vis stay away
orders, then, it appears that a lower burden of proof suffices, because
"the limits imposed upon a defendant's private interests carry far less
weight in the Mathews analysis than does the governmental interest in
eliminating [sexual assault] and in affording immediate and effective
protection to victims of [sexual] violence."257
The analysis does not end there, however. Restrictions on freedom
of movement are but one of the many possible remedies available to
victims of sexual violence. As existing restraining order mechanisms-
DVROs, SAPOs, and CHROs- demonstrate legislatures have the
ability to impose significant restrictions on respondents beyond freedom
of movement. These restrictions include, inter alia, restrictions on
ability to communicate with the petitioner's family,258 relinquishment of
254. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (discussing the significance of civil
commitment as akin to incarceration).
255. See, e.g., State v. Keaveney, 28 P.3d 372, 374 (Idaho 2001) (holding it
unconstitutionally impermissible to shift burdens of proof in criminal matter in a matter
inconsistent with the criminal statute in question); see also Donald A. Dripps, The
Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1665, 1684
(1987) (discussing vagueness implications of shifting burdens of persuasion on a case-
by-case basis).
256. See Mindlin & Reeves, supra note 77, at 20 (explaining that factors
exacerbating risk of future assault for victims include how much the assailant knows
about the victim and the degree of contact with the assailant).
257. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1176.
258. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50C-5 (West 2013) (North Carolina's
Civil No Contact Order prohibits communication directly or indirectly with petitioner
and family or household members).
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21260 261firearms,259 electronic monitoring, monetary compensation, and any
other relief the court deems appropriate.262 One must also consider the
"adverse social consequences to the individual" 263  of a public
adjudication that he has committed a sexual assault.264
Some of these restrictions, such as the loss of child custody and
relinquishment of firearms, directly impinge upon recognized
constitutional rights, and therefore require additional scrutiny. 265 As
with court hearings impinging upon fundamental liberty interests such
as the right to parent one's own children, a carefully tailored SAPO
should require a heightened adjudicatory finding before depriving
respondents of basic and fundamental constitutional liberty interests. As
discussed below, such a balanced approach can be achieved without
eliminating the efficacy of SAPOs by requiring a lower preponderance
burden of proof at the trial phase and a high clear and convincing
evidence burden of proof for the imposition of certain "punishments"
and the "sentencing" phase.
259. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-15-102(f) (West 2011) (Montana
"Civil Protective Order" authorizing same if the gun was used in the assault); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214(F)(2) (West 2016) (Ohio's Civil Protection Order
authorizing relinquishment of firearms); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West
2016) (Oklahoma Civil Protection Order authorizing same); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
813.125(4m) (2015-16) (Wisconsin "Civil Harassment Restraining Order" authorizing
same).
260. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214 (authorizing electronic monitoring
under appropriate circumstances).
261. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(C)(12-15) (2014) (Alaska's
domestic violence restraining order authorizing monetary compensation); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6342(a)(1) (West 1994) (California domestic violence restraining order
authorizing same); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (2017) (Delaware domestic
violence restraining order authorizing same); ME. STAT. tit. 19, § 4007(1)(K) (2016)
(Maine's "Protection from Abuse Order" authorizing same).
262. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.05(a)(1) (West 2015); see also,
e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. § 5131(c)(1) (2011) (authorizing other orders the court deems
necessary to protect petitioner or other parties involved); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
7.90.090(2)(d) (West 2007) (authorizing any other relief as the court deems necessary
to protect the petitioner).
263. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
264. See id. at 432.
265. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768-70 (2010)
(recognizing the right to bear arms protected by the Second Amendment as a
fundamental right); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1981) (recognizing the
historical significance of protecting family matters, including the right to parent one's
own children, as a fundamental liberty interest); Robinson v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr., 564
A.2d 140, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) ("The preservation of the parent-child
relationship as reflected in the right to raise one's children has been deemed 'essential,'
a 'basic civil right of man' ..... (citations omitted)).
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2. THE RISK OF AN ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION
The most significant criticisms leveled against DVROs, SAPOs
and other restraining orders involve the risk that a government will
erroneously deprive a respondent of the foregoing liberty interests by
issuing restraining orders in response to false accusations. 266 A natural
tension exists here with respect to sexual assault, which by its nature is
a private and intimate act often characterized by a paucity of extrinsic
evidence and little to adjudicate beyond the conflicting narratives of the
parties.
As discussed above, different courts have applied this risk of
erroneous deprivation prong in different ways. 267 As the Supreme Court
of New Jersey suggested in In re Polk, a lack of objectively verifiable
evidence creates a very real risk of erroneous deprivation-that courts
will "get it wrong"-suggesting that a higher burden of proof may be
required to guard against erroneous results.268 As some critics have
suggested, why should the burden of persuasion be lowered because of
an inherent paucity of evidence?269 Should not the reverse be true?
Should not courts erect more significant barriers where, as with
intimate partner and sexual violence, there exists a lack of extrinsic
evidence, and critical judgments are made on the basis of conflicting
testimony, leading to an increased risk of abuse? 270
This argument ignores two important points. First, the second
Mathews prong considers not only the "risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used," but also "the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards ....
In other words, imposing a heightened "clear and convincing evidence"
burden of proof only makes constitutional sense under this second
266. See Hutton, supra note 34, at 110-11.
267. See, e.g., In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 16 (N.J. 1982) (finding that a higher
burden of proof should apply when the evidence is not readily susceptible to "objective
assessment," and thus there stands an increased risk of error); Crespo v. Crespo, 972
A.2d 1169, 1176-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (finding that lower burdens of
proof may be required when there exists a lack of evidentiary clarity so that the right to
relief is not effectively foreclosed to deserving petitioners).
268. In re Polk, 449 A.2d at 16.
269. See Heleniak, supra note 34, at 1015 (lamenting the ability of domestic
violence victims to secure a restraining order on less than overwhelming evidence that
includes "hearsay and examples of prior bad acts that are not allowed under the rules of
evidence . . . [and] prior events that were not alleged in the complaint"); see also id. at
1015-16 ("After a few short hours of testimony . . . the judge declares that by a
preponderance of the evidence the defendant committed the acts charged in the
complaint, effectively labeling the defendant as a wife-beater.").
270. See Hutton, supra note 34, at 116-17 (criticizing court reasoning that,
"because the risk of erroneous deprivation in domestic violence cases is so high, the
court ought to employ a lower standard of proof, contrary to the holding in Mathews").
271. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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prong if this higher burden somehow reduces the risk of erroneous
deprivation. In fact, the opposite appears true. National studies find that
false rape and sexual assault allegation rates stand at approximately 2-
10%, suggesting that the risk of erroneous deprivation is already a
small one.272 When one considers the very public shaming sexual
assault victims face when they come forward to hold their accusers to
account, it becomes clear why so few women would voluntarily subject
themselves to such ridicule under false pretenses.
Second, even a lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
requires some probable ,showing that sexual assault occurred. If a
factfinder hears two equally plausible conflicting testimonial accounts,
and no other corroborating evidence exists, a restraining order will not
issue even under this lower burden of proof. In truth, the same
argument applies for sexual assault as does domestic violence: "a clear-
and-convincing evidence standard would saddle victims of [sexual
assault] with a burden that would often foreclose relief in many
deserving cases."2 73
But burdens of proof are not the only procedural safeguards
available. States should consider the utility of imposing other
evidentiary requirements to guard against the risk of erroneous
deprivation, including the requirement of in-person testimony by
petitioners and third party witnesses and an appropriate opportunity for
cross-examination.
3. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
As with domestic violence, the governmental interest in preventing
sexual assault cannot be overstated. When a woman is sexually
assaulted every two minutes, and economic costs from rape and sexual
assault top $127 billion per year, it goes without saying that state
governments have a special interest and obligation to do anything
possible to reverse the tide of such an epidemic.274 Governments simply
can neither afford nor justify "the steep price of permitting countless
more meritorious claims to be lost at the hands of the clear-and-
convincing evidence standard" and other overly burdensome procedural
safeguards.275
272. See David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis
of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1318 (2010)
(examining ten years' worth of reported cases of rape and sexual assault and concluding
that "the prevalence of false allegations is between 2% and 10% ").
273. Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009).
274. See Where We Stand, supra note 4.
275. Crespo, 972 A.2d at 1177.
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4. CONCLUSION
It appears likely, then, that SAPOs should employ the lower
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to ensure that victims have an
effective mechanism to seek prospective relief and governments have an
effective tool in combating the sexual assault epidemic. However,
procedural due process may require a more nuanced approach with
respect to the types of evidentiary showings necessary to meet this
standard and with the types of prospective relief available to petitioners.
The next section recommends a balanced approach that addresses these
competing practical and constitutional concerns.
V. A BALANCED APPROACH: A MODEL SEXUAL ASSAULT PROTECTION
ORDER
Any sexual assault protection order seeking to balance the need for
a practical and effective tool for petitioners and for a constitutionally
sound set of procedural protections for respondents must contain, at a
minimum, a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that both: (1)
a sexual assault or credible threat of sexual assault occurred, and (2) the
petitioner reasonably feels fear of future harm from the respondent. In
addition, courts should require the in-person testimony of anyone
otherwise under the subpoena powers of the state and the parties, unless
doing so would create a real and present danger for the petitioner or
other witnesses. Finally, prospective relief available should be limited
to stay-away orders and monetary compensation, unless a petitioner can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence why constitutional rights
such as the right to bear arms should be infringed in the interest of
petitioner safety.
A. Two Required Elements of a SAPO: Past Conduct and Fear of
Future Harm
All civil protection orders are premised on the allegation that
either past criminal conduct has occurred or imminently will occur
absent relief. 276 The same should be true for SAPOs. This section
examines each type of harm in turn.
276. See Jane K. Stoever, Freedom From Violence: Using the Stages of
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIo ST. L.J. 303,
373 (2011) ("The purpose of civil protection orders is to rapidly provide relief to help a
person become safe . . . .").
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1. PAST CONDUCT: PAST SEXUAL ASSAULT OR CREDIBLE THREAT OF
FUTURE ASSAULT
For all existing sexual assault protection order statutes, states
require a showing that a sexual assault did, in fact, occur.27 7 States
differ, however, with respect to how many past sexual assaults must
have occurred before relief can be granted. For example, Washington's
SAPO statute requires only a showing that a single past sexual assault
has occurred, whereas Massachusetts' harassment restraining order
(which includes sexual assault) requires a minimum of three past acts.278
The Massachusetts model is gravely flawed and should not form
the basis of SAPO requirements moving forward. Requiring petitioners
to prove a pattern of repeated sexual assaults before securing relief
ignores the seriousness of sexual assault as "the most heinous crime . .
. short of murder." 2 79 As discussed supra, a single incident of sexual
assault risks sending a victim into a "hyper-vigilant" state, where she
feels constant insecurity and vulnerability.2 80 Moreover, a single
incident at the hands of an attacker is more than sufficient to trigger
crippling harm for the victim at the mere mention or presence of the
assailant in the future. 28 1 For these very real reasons, it makes no sense
to require a victim to suffer multiple assaults before even having the
opportunity to be free from her attacker's presence.
However, states should also acknowledge and grant relief in
situations where specific, credible threats have been made against
petitioners even when no sexual assault has yet occurred. Protection
277. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.850(a) (2014) (relief available to a
person who believes that the person is a victim of sexual assault); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 527.6(a)(1) (West 2014) (relief available to a person who has been
harassed or sexually assaulted); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/201 (West 2010) (relief
available for any person who is a victim of non-consensual penetration); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.90.020(1) (West 2007) (relief available for anyone who is a victim of
nonconsensual sexual conduct).
278. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 1 (2010) (relief available to a person
who suffers three or more acts of harassment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.020(1)
(requiring only a single past act of sexual contact); Jodoin, supra note 12, at 128
(noting confusion over whether Massachusetts' amended harassment statute requires
more than one act of sexual violence for an order to issue).
279. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (Illinois' sexual assault protection
order statute: "Purpose: Sexual assault is the most heinous crime against another person
short of murder. Sexual assault inflicts humiliation, degradation, and terror on
victims."); see also WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 7.90.005 ("Sexual assault is the most
heinous crime against another person short of murder. Sexual assault inflicts
humiliation, degradation, and terror on victims.").
280. Jodoin, supra note 12, at 110.
281. See Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Survivors, supra note 107.
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orders are designed to prevent future harm, and that should be true
even where no past criminal conduct has yet occurred.282
The ability to issue a restraining order solely on the basis of a
threat should be narrowly tailored, however. Vague, generalized, or
long ago threats neither inspire genuine credible fear of imminent future
harm nor should form the basis for the issuance of a restraining order.
Threats should be specific, recent, and accompanied by some type of
prior conduct sufficient to give rise to a reasonable, credible fear of
future harm. Terrorist threat statutes, such as California's criminal
terrorist threat statute, provide an appealing model for how to provide
meaningful limits on the issuance of SAPOs in response solely to
threats.283
2. REASONABLE FEAR OF FUTURE HARM
Restraining orders exist to provide prospective relief to victims to
protect them from future harm. Therefore, it would make neither
logical nor constitutional sense to issue a restraining order where the
victim felt no fear of future harm. For example, if an assailant is
incarcerated and serving a life sentence, a victim need not secure a
restraining order to protect herself from future harm. Or to the put the
point more directly, a victim need not seek prospective relief protecting
her from her attacker if the attacker is dead.
282. To take this logic one step further, one might wonder what logical
predicate requires the existence of a past act or imminent threat of future attack at all if
the goal is simply to prevent future assaults. For example, if a person possesses the
criminal record or displays the characteristics of sexually deviant or predatory
tendencies such that one could predict with reasonable certainty that an attack will
happen at some point in the future, why not proactively issue a restraining order to
prevent the future harm? Several reasons. First, this hypothetical more accurately
describes a "Minority Report" type Hollywood account of the world than it does actual
predictive capabilities in the real world. Second, to the extent that courts possess any
such predictive capacity in this regard, the two most salient indicators of a future
assault are past conduct and immediately recent threatening activity. Third, as a
constitutional matter, courts cannot and should not issue sweeping orders infringing on
basic fundamental liberties without a credible basis for concluding that such
infringement is necessary at that time.
283. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422(a) (West 2011) (requiring state to prove the
victim experienced reasonable "sustained fear" to achieve a conviction for criminal
terrorist threat). The element of "sustained fear" requires a certain level of specificity,
and must be informed some amount of prior conduct to reasonably convey the
imminence of the threat. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 11 (1995)
(finding that "sustained fear" is reasonable for purposes of section 422 if the threat was
sufficiently specific "that [the] statement would be taken as a threat, whether or not he
actually intended to carry it out," and accompanied by "[t]he victim's knowledge of . .
. prior conduct" to demonstrate actual fear of future harm). Requiring a similar
showing of specificity for an imminent threat of harm would prevent the overuse or
potential abuse of a SAPO based on threats alone.
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Outside these rare and extreme examples, however, states should
impose few restrictions on a petitioner's ability to satisfy this element.
For example, some states require petitioners to demonstrate a credible
fear that they will face the same type of harm in the future, i.e., another
sexual assault.284 Such a requirement ignores the reality faced by
victims of sexual assault. Following an assault, the mere mention or
presence of the attacker can cause immeasurable harm.285 Moreover,
numerous cases exist where rapists continue to terrorize their victims
through actions other than physical assaults, such as stalking, threats,
or cyberbullying.286 SAPO statutes should not restrict access to relief
based solely on how or in what way the attacker will harm his victim in
the future. It should suffice for petitioners to show that a reasonable
likelihood exists that the assailant has the likely opportunity to cause
future harm.
B. Evidentiary Requirements: In-Person Testimony
If, on the one hand, a model SAPO provides expanded relief for
mere threats of sexual assault and fears of any type of future harm, then
it should, on the other hand, require specific forms of credible and
corroborative evidence to secure this relief. In particular, courts should
not issue restraining orders solely on the basis of written declarations
without the opportunity for in-person confrontation and meaningful
cross-examination.
Some may argue that petitioners should not be required to appear
in person at a civil protection order hearing, particularly given that
certain rape shield laws have historically protected rape victims from
appearing in criminal trials. But criminal matters balance this inability
to confront the accuser with a requirement that guilt be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the civil protection order context, a much lower
burden of proof applies. Petitioners should not have the benefit of a
lower burden of proof and also the ability to meet this low burden of
proof solely through written testimony. At a minimum, petitioners
284. See Jodoin, supra note 12, at 128 ("[M]any sexual assault victims may
not be in a substantial likelihood of being sexually assaulted again. They may, however,
be vulnerable to harassment, intimidation, or other physical or psychological harm at
the hands of their attacker.") (citations omitted).
285. See Mindlin & Reeves, supra note 77, at 20 (explaining that sexual
assault victims' safety risks fall along a continuum based on a number of factors,
including the identity of the assailant, how much the assailant knows about the victim,
the location of the assault, the presence of weapons or other perpetrators during the
assault, the extent of physical injuries, and the degree of contact between the victim and
the assailant both before and after the assault).
286. See Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Survivors, supra note 107
(describing rape trauma syndrome, including the ability to be triggered into a state of
paralysis in the presence of one's attacker).
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should be required to demonstrate with reasonable certainty a
significant risk of harm flowing from her in-person courtroom presence
before being allowed to rest on written sworn declarations.287
C. Prospective Relief: Heightened Proof or Greater Liberty
Deprivations
Any prospective restraining order relief should start with a
requirement that the respondent stay away from and have no contact
with the petitioner. Other relief not directly affecting a constitutional
right, such as monetary compensation, should be available where
appropriate. However, any other relief infringing upon a respondent's
fundamental constitutional freedoms should be restricted to a showing
that such relief is specifically necessary on the facts presented. One
such common type of relief offered by restraining orders includes the
relinquishment of firearms.
The Second Amendment provides that "the right . . . to . . . bear
Arms shall not be infringed."288 However, as with any constitutional
right, this right is far from absolute. Criminal defendants and
respondents in civil restraining order actions regularly must relinquish
firearms when their past conduct suggests a violent pattern sufficient to
justify depriving them of deadly weapons.289 Given the primacy of
firearm ownership as a constitutional right, however, the ability to
require relinquishment of firearms should be limited in the SAPO
context to situations where the facts themselves suggest a propensity
towards physical violence or violence with a deadly weapon.
While this Article does not call for changing existing state
restraining order statutes which mandate the automatic relinquishment
of firearms upon the issuance of any restraining order, where state
287. In striking the right balance, legislators should also be cognizant of the
very real, damaging, and long-term effects the presence of a restraining order on one's
record has on future educational, employment, and housing prospects. While this
Article makes no comment on the fairness or propriety of this reality, it is worth noting
that, much like a prison sentence, these "quasi-punishment" collateral consequences of
a restraining order often outlive the terms of the restraining order itself. To the extent a
protection order statute seeks only to prospectively protect the individual victim and
neither intends to "punish" the perpetrator not create a general deterrent effect,
legislators may consider the possibility of sealing SAPO records as a further effort to
find a principled balance.
288. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
289. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-15-201 (West 2011) (Montana
"Temporary Order of Protection" authorizing relinquishment of firearms if the gun was
used in the assault); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214(F)(2) (West 2016) (Ohio's Civil
Protection Order authorizing relinquishment of firearms); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.11(5) (West 2016) (Oklahoma Civil Protection Order authorizing same); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 813.125 (West 2015-16) (Wisconsin Civil Harassment Restraining Order
authorizing same).
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statutes are silent this Article calls for the constitutionally sound
requirement of a heightened clear-and-convincing evidence standard
showing that relinquishment of firearms is necessary for the prevention
of future harm. This requirement in essence creates a bifurcated trial
similar to criminal proceedings, whereby proof of "guilt" is governed
by a preponderance of the evidence standard and proof of certain
remedial necessities at the "sentencing" phase is governed by a higher
standard.290
The ultimate grant of relief, however, should be fact specific and
considered on a case by case basis. Bright line rules, such as the one
employed by Montana's restraining order statutes, prove unworkable in
practice. Montana's civil restraining order statutes, which encompass
relief for sexual assault victims, require a gun to actually have been
used in the assault before a court can order firearms relinquished."'
Such a bright line rule ignores the fact that attackers can demonstrate
their propensity for violence-and indeed, their willingness to kill-
without the use of a firearm in a particular attack. Moreover, such a
rule denies petitioners the ability to present evidence demonstrating a
credible fear of future harm based on an assailant's past conduct or
threats involving firearms.
CONCLUSION
Archaic stereotypes about sexual assault perpetuate the notion that
most rapes are committed by "strangers-in-the-bushes," when in reality
the majority of sexual assaults are committed by acquaintances of the
victims. Often sexual assault victims have close, ongoing contact with
their assailants at school, work, or home, and thus remain at significant
risk of continued harm in the weeks and months after the initial assault.
This reality, coupled with the epidemic failure of the criminal justice
system to prosecute offenders, highlights the urgent need for
prospective, victim-centered relief designed specifically to protect
sexual assault victims from future violence from their attackers.
Any such prospective protective order mechanism must be
carefully tailored to address the unique needs of sexual assault victims,
including implementing a reasonable burden of proof that reflects the
relative lack of extrinsic evidence in most cases and the need to provide
an attainable form of relief for victims in need. Such protection order
290. In practice, this higher burden of proof should not present an
insurmountable obstacle in deserving cases, as sexual assault advocates and experts note
that the presence of firearms or other weapons at an assault or the assailant's known
possession of deadly weapons demonstrates a markedly increased risk of future violent
harm.
291. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201(f).
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mechanisms should also recognize the wide range of probable future
harm facing sexual assault victims and require only a probable fear of
some future harm instead of a particular type of harm or future fear of
a repeat sexual assault. However, given the serious liberty deprivations
contemplated by restraining orders, as well as the social condemnation
attached to an adjudication that a respondent has committed a sexual
assault, these statutes should employ certain procedural safeguards to
protect the rights of the accused, including the right to personally
confront and cross-examine witnesses. Finally, any available relief
should be limited to no contact orders, monetary relief and other
remedies not directly implicating a fundamental liberty interest, unless
the need for a more consequential remedy can be proven by a
heightened burden of proof. This balanced approach to SAPO relief
will ensure both that sexual assault victims have real and ready access
to prospective civil protections and that the constitutional rights of the
accused remain protected in the process.
